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Criminal law scholars have long agreed that prosecutors wield vast
and largely unreviewable discretion in the criminal justice system. This
Article argues that this discretion now extends beyond criminal penalties
and broadly reaches civil public policy decisions, such as deportation
and licensing. As a result of ubiquitous plea bargaining and collateral
consequences—state-imposed civil penalties that are triggered by crimi-
nal convictions—prosecutors can deliberately exercise discretion to trig-
ger or avoid important civil consequences. This aspect of prosecutorial
discretion has been underexamined, partly because of a lack of aware-
ness of collateral consequences. But as a result of important new initia-
tives designed to promote information about collateral consequences,
prosecutors as well as defendants are becoming more likely to know that
even minor convictions can trigger much more serious civil penalties. As
some commentators have pointed out, prosecutors who are aware of
collateral consequences may have powerful incentives to drop charges or
otherwise structure pleas to minimize the likelihood of certain collateral
consequences. But importantly, prosecutors also have strong structural
incentives to take the opposite approach and reach pleas to maximize the
likelihood of civil penalties. For some prosecutors, enforcing collateral
consequences serves as an administratively efficient substitute for a
criminal conviction, as a source of leverage, as a way to circumvent the
requirements of criminal procedure, as a means of achieving deterrence
or retribution, or as a way to promote their own public policy prefer-
ences. This Article develops an analytic framework for understanding the
structural incentives that lead prosecutors to influence collateral conse-
quences; exposes legal and ethical problems associated with plea bargain-
ing in light of collateral consequences; and argues that collateral
consequences can undermine important interests in transparency and
accountability.
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INTRODUCTION
Today, the consequences of having a criminal record can far outstrip any
penalty imposed by criminal law.1 Consider the case of Andre Venant, a
longtime lawful permanent resident, who was punished with a seven-day sen-
tence for evading subway fares but whose conviction landed him in immigration
detention for six months.2 Or consider the case of Washington, D.C. resident
Maurice Alexander, who served a ten-day sentence for a misdemeanor convic-
tion but paid a steeper penalty when his criminal record kept him out of public
housing.3 His conviction carries a host of other penalties as well; it automati-
1. Criminal history records are defined as “identifiable descriptions and notations of arrests, deten-
tions, indictments, or other formal criminal charges, and any disposition arising therefrom, including
acquittal, sentencing, correctional supervision, or release.” 42 U.S.C. § 14616(I)(4)(A) (2012).
2. See Nina Bernstein, When a MetroCard Led Far Out of Town; Post-9/11, Even Evading Subway
Fares Can Raise the Prospect of Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, at B1. Turnstile jumping can
be considered a “crime[] involving moral turpitude” for immigration purposes. Immigration and
Nationality Act § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2012).
3. Monica Haymond, Should a Criminal Record Come with Collateral Consequences?, NPR (Dec.
6, 2014, 5:03 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/12/06/368742300/should-a-criminal-record-come-with-
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cally bars him from obtaining a license in the District of Columbia to work as a
security officer, a real estate appraiser, an architect, a pharmacist, or a barber.4
Academic literature characterizes these types of collateral consequences—state-
imposed civil penalties that are triggered by criminal convictions—as operating
as an “invisible punishment.”5 The label highlights a troubling information gap:
although some collateral consequences can function as a punishment from the
perspective of defendants, all too often no actor in the criminal justice system—
prosecutor, defense attorney, or judge—knows about them or takes them into
account during the plea bargaining or sentencing process.
Due in part to remarkable advocacy by leading public defenders, this dy-
namic is changing. New initiatives now cross-reference criminal penalties with
state-imposed civil consequences, allowing defendants to more easily learn
whether a potential conviction might trigger a consequence like deportation.6
Because virtually all criminal convictions stem from guilty pleas, commentators
and advocates have linked informed consideration of collateral consequences to
the potential for better outcomes, particularly in the case of minor criminal
convictions.7 The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, which
collateral-consequences [http://perma.cc/A3TZ-WYOT] (stating that Alexander was convicted of an
attempt to threaten).
4. See id.; Choose a Jurisdiction, NAT’L INVENTORY COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES CONVICTION, http://www.
abacollateralconsequences.org/map/ [http://perma.cc/2V26-M5FP] (last visited Dec. 24, 2015) (interac-
tive map that permits a user to view certain collateral consequences by jurisdiction).
5. See, e.g., INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT (Marc
Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); see also Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective
Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 700 (2002)
(“Collateral consequences can operate as a secret sentence.”).
Throughout this Article, I use the term “collateral consequence” to refer only to state-imposed
decisions, such as deportation, bars to obtaining professional licenses, or receiving public benefits. I
focus on state-imposed action because that is the only type of collateral consequence that is capable of
being identified systematically and taken into account during the plea bargaining process. See infra
Section I.B. (discussing new developments to collect, code, and cross-reference collateral consequences
against criminal convictions).
6. In addition to seeking to promote informational transparency, advocates have also made efforts to
reduce the number of collateral consequences. Nonetheless, a vast network of collateral consequences
remains in place. See Search, NAT’L INVENTORY COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES CONVICTION, http://www.
abacollateralconsequences.org/search/ [http://perma.cc/2V26-M5FP] (last visited Dec. 24, 2015) (esti-
mating that over 47,000 state and federal collateral consequences currently exist).
7. For a sampling of the commentary discussing this approach, see Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain
Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1815 (2013) (describing
strategies for obtaining “immigration-safe” pleas and the structural barriers to achieving them); Chin &
Holmes, supra note 5, at 719–23; Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating
Collateral Consequences and Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067
(2004); McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic Evolution of Padilla v.
Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. L.J. 795, 812–14 (2011) [hereinaf-
ter Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”]; McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A
Criminal Defense Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. TOL.
L. REV. 479, 494–96 (2005) [hereinafter Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word]; Robin Steinberg, Heeding
Gideon’s Call in the Twenty-First Century: Holistic Defense and the New Public Defense Paradigm, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 961, 1018 (2013); J. McGregor Smyth, Jr., From Arrest to Reintegration: A Model
for Mitigating Collateral Consequences of Criminal Proceedings, 24 CRIM. JUST., Fall 2009, at 42.
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held that defense attorneys must provide advice about certain immigration
consequences of convictions, endorsed this practice.8 The Court linked plea
bargaining in light of collateral consequences to mutual advantage, reasoning
that “informed consideration” of collateral consequences “can only benefit both
the State and noncitizen defendants” because “the defense and prosecution may
well be able to reach agreements that better satisfy the interests of both
parties.”9
This assumption, however, overlooks the incentives of a key player: the
prosecutor.10 This Article looks forward to a legal regime in which parties can
more easily learn about state-imposed collateral consequences and take them
into account during the plea bargaining process. I agree that these efforts are
desirable and necessary to allowing defendants to make informed decisions.
However, in a criminal justice system defined by ubiquitous plea bargaining and
a focus on low-level and redundant offenses, this approach inevitably and
significantly expands the reach of prosecutorial discretion. It shifts discretion to
prosecutors to decide whether and when to pursue collateral consequences.
Even in low-level criminal cases, prosecutors can control important civil out-
comes such as deportation, public benefits, and professional licensing.
Drawing on defense practice guides, court documents, prosecutorial policy
statements, and existing empirical studies, this Article argues that prosecutors
have powerful incentives to “prosecute” collateral consequences—meaning that
they at times use their vast and unreviewable discretion over the criminal justice
system to shape civil outcomes. In some cases, this dynamic may be justified,
such as where the collateral consequence is closely related to the underlying
criminal conduct and it has a demonstrable and proportionate deterrent effect.
But this dynamic also necessarily allows prosecutors to influence collateral
consequences in more far-reaching circumstances. Focusing on low-level of-
fenses prosecuted in state courts, this Article develops three conceptual models
for how informed prosecutors approach collateral consequences: collateral miti-
For a discussion of the overwhelming resolution of criminal cases by plea agreement, see Lafler v.
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Jenny Roberts,
Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2663 (2013) (describing Frye as making the
“important statement that . . . ‘the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is
almost always the critical point for a defendant’” (quoting Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407)).
8. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
9. Id. at 373. In an opinion that described collateral consequences as “enmeshed” and “intimately
related” to the criminal charges, the Court stated that defense counsel could seek “to plea bargain
creatively . . . to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by
avoiding a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the removal consequence.” Id. at 365,
373.
10. In making this claim, my focus lies outside the corporate crime context. For discussions of
collateral consequences in the corporate plea negotiation context, see, for example, BRANDON L.
GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL (2014); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV.
853, 855 (2007); Julie R. O’Sullivan, How Prosecutors Apply the “Federal Prosecutions of Corpora-
tions” Charging Policy in the Era of Deferred Prosecutions, and What That Means for the Purposes of
the Federal Criminal Sanction, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 32 (2014) (criticizing federal prosecutions
that take into account collateral consequences).
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gation, collateral enforcement, and an approach that I characterize as the
counterbalance model, where prosecutors seek a harsher criminal penalty in
exchange for avoiding a collateral outcome. Thus, a defendant who seeks an
immigration-safe plea might be required to “plead up” to a more severe crime or
serve a longer prison sentence.
Consider how an informed prosecutor might have exercised discretion in the
case of Jennifer Smith, who was never convicted of a crime but whose record
cost her a bank teller job in New York City.11 Prosecutors offered to drop minor
shoplifting charges if she agreed to a common form of conditional dismissal
known as an “adjournment in contemplation of dismissal,” or ACD.12 In an
ACD, the defendant agrees to keep the arrest open for up to six months; if there
are no new arrests in the interim, the case is dismissed.13 Smith’s case was
dismissed and her arrest and prosecution were “deemed a nullity” under New
York law.14 But she nonetheless lost the job because federal banking law treated
the ACD as a prohibitive “diversion[ary] program.”15 After conducting a manda-
tory background check, the bank was required to rescind her offer.16
Suppose Smith had been aware that the ACD would cost her the job, and she
raised the issue with the prosecutor. The prosecutor would have important
structural incentives to mitigate job loss by dropping the charge altogether. The
prosecutor could reason that Smith might otherwise reject the ACD and opt for
a much more time consuming trial. A prosecutor who decides that the case does
not merit the resources of a trial employs an administrative efficiency rationale.
Alternatively, the prosecutor could drop the case because she views job loss
itself as criminogenic: if Smith loses her ability to work, she could resort to
committing serious crime. This approach represents a law enforcement rationale
where the prosecutor links the collateral consequence to its impact on crime
control. The prosecutor might also have a public policy preference not to upset
the bank’s hiring decision or make the judgment that the job loss functions as a
disproportionate, unjustified penalty. These rationales are conceptually distinct,
but they all lead to the same result: Smith keeps the bank teller job.
Similar rationales also can be marshalled in support of a policy of collateral
enforcement. Suppose the prosecutor’s first preference is a conviction; she has
chosen to pursue the ACD only because of resource constraints or due to the
absence of admissible evidence. The prosecutor might substitute job loss for
the preferred criminal penalty—an approach that is also efficient because the
prosecutor can avoid time spent in investigating and pursuing criminal charges.
The prosecutor might see the civil penalty as deterring law-breaking, reasoning
11. Smith v. Bank of Am. Corp., 865 F. Supp. 2d 298, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
12. Id.
13. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55 (McKinney 2014).
14. Smith, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 300, 302.
15. Id. at 304; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (prohibiting those who have agreed to enter a diversionary
program from “participat[ing] . . . in the conduct of the affairs of any insured depository institutions”).
16. Id. at 300.
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that a suspected shoplifter could commit more serious crimes if placed in a
bank. A prosecutor might have generalized public policy reasons for collateral
enforcement; the prosecutor could believe that people with recent arrest histo-
ries tend to have bad judgment and that banks should not hire them. The
prosecutor acts within her considerable discretion in making any of these
judgments and seeking the ACD because it results in job loss.
The prosecutor might also take the middle ground: the counterbalance ap-
proach. Suppose the prosecutor is sympathetic to averting job loss but does not
want to offer Smith a better plea than other defendants arrested on shoplifting
charges. Or suppose the prosecutor suspects that Smith is lying about the job
offer to get the case dismissed outright. The prosecutor could agree to dispose
of the case in a way that does not affect the job, but only if Smith agrees to a
disposition that is more severe than the ACD. The prosecutor requires Smith to
“trade up” to a more severe sanction. From the prosecutor’s perspective,
Smith’s willingness to pay the price of a more severe criminal penalty authenti-
cates the collateral consequence. From the perspective of the prosecutor, it can
also function as a way to treat like cases alike.
This Article develops these models and makes two key contributions. First, it
offers an analytic framework for understanding how prosecutors influence
collateral consequences. As advocates, courts, and commentators have rightly
noted, informed prosecutors can use their discretion to mitigate; they can offer a
flexible, reasoned response to collateral consequences that no one—prosecutors,
defense attorneys, civil regulators, or society at large—believes to be appropri-
ate.17 Yet the same dynamics that enable mitigation—overlapping criminal
codes, a focus on low-level criminal offenses, charging discretion, and wide-
spread collateral consequences—also allow prosecutors to enforce collateral
consequences. Teasing apart the motivations that inform prosecutorial ap-
proaches to collateral consequences is necessary to assess whether and when
informed plea bargaining will address the deeper concerns that some collateral
consequences are disproportionate, procedurally unfair, and create arbitrary and
inconsistent public policy.
Second, this Article uses this framework to demonstrate why equating in-
formed consideration of collateral consequences with the potential for better
outcomes may be too optimistic. As a general matter, criminal law scholars have
been keenly attuned to the dangers of concentrating unreviewable power in the
hands of prosecutors. But in the context of collateral consequences, commenta-
tors have welcomed prosecutorial discretion as an important—and in some
cases the only—way to mitigate collateral consequences.
This Article supplements this account by showing that there are perils to
blending civil and criminal penalties through the plea bargaining process.
Prosecutors can take approaches that magnify their enforcement power, skirt the
requirements of criminal procedure, or impose their own public policy prefer-
17. See infra Section I.C.
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ences. This dynamic can also create broader harms for communities, law
enforcement, and civil regulators. Collateral consequences create regulatory
opacity. Civil consequences might follow without a prosecutor’s knowledge, in
spite of a prosecutor’s efforts at mitigation, or as a result of reasoned enforce-
ment efforts by prosecutors. Communities who seek to evaluate law enforce-
ment outcomes thus face significant barriers to understanding how prosecutors
are exercising their discretion.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides context regarding prosecuto-
rial discretion, the dominant critiques of collateral consequences, and emerging
legal responses. Part II focuses on state prosecutors and develops an analytic
framework for understanding how informed prosecutors might approach collat-
eral consequences. Part III uses this framework to evaluate how informed
consideration of collateral consequences expands the impact of prosecutorial
discretion. It argues that prosecutorial discretion in light of collateral conse-
quences has the potential to magnify the impact of certain collateral conse-
quences, displace other competing concerns, and create barriers to understanding
how prosecutors are exercising their discretion. I conclude with a preliminary
evaluation of potential avenues for reform.
I. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
Plea bargaining grants prosecutors enormous power in the criminal justice
system. Defendants in low-level cases have powerful incentives to plead guilty
as quickly as possible, regardless of the strength of the evidence against them.
But today, even expedient and seemingly minor pleas can carry hidden costs.
They can trigger much more serious collateral consequences. This Part situates
plea bargaining and collateral consequences within the broader realm of U.S.
criminal law administration. It discusses the dominant critiques of collateral
consequences and then turns to recent efforts to promote informed plea
bargaining.
A. CRIMINAL LAW AND THE PLEA BARGAINING PROCESS
For offenses ranging from the petty to the most severe, prosecutors—rather
than judges and juries—are the arbiters of today’s criminal justice system.18
Expansive codes criminalize a range of common behavior, giving prosecutors
18. ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5 (2007) (describ-
ing prosecutors as “the most powerful officials in the criminal justice system” and discussing the power
of prosecutors across a number of dimensions); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the
Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009) (arguing
that “the combination of law enforcement and adjudicative power in a single prosecutor is the most
significant design flaw in the federal criminal system”); Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal,
122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39, 39 (2012) (“In our real justice system, the prosecutor is the effective
adjudicator of guilt or innocence and the de facto sentencing authority.”); Ronald F. Wright & Kay L.
Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (2014) (describing
American prosecutors as the “de facto adjudicators in criminal courts”).
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considerable charging discretion.19 Because well over ninety percent of all
criminal convictions are the result of plea bargains, prosecutors exercise the
functional authority to both “define the law on the street and decide who has
violated it.”20
For serious offenses, some commentators theorize that plea bargains work
best when the deal reflects the parties’ predicted outcomes at trial.21 In this
view, prosecutors ought to make offers based on how they value a case, taking
into account considerations such as the seriousness of the charged offense and
the likelihood of winning at trial.22 But prosecutors also take into account other
factors, such as their own workloads and their long-term professional interests
in building their reputations and securing a “win.”23 The risk is that the desire to
secure the plea bargain itself becomes the driving force, as opposed to concerns
about justice or fairness.24 As former federal district judge John Gleeson put it,
“To coerce guilty pleas, and sometimes to coerce cooperation as well, prosecu-
tors routinely threaten ultra-harsh, enhanced mandatory sentences that no one—
not even the prosecutors themselves—thinks are appropriate.”25 This practice
might serve the interests of the prosecutor’s office—it allows for pleas to be
secured efficiently—but it harms the public’s interest in securing justice.
For minor crimes in state courts, where prosecutors process a large volume of
relatively low-level arrests, the plea pressures are distinct but nonetheless
pervasive.26 Although felonies receive the most attention, minor crimes consti-
tute the bulk of state-court workloads.27 For low-level offenses, prosecutors
19. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 512
(2001) (“Criminal law is both broad and deep: a great deal of conduct is criminalized, and of that
conduct, a large proportion is criminalized many times over.”).
20. Id. at 511.
21. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909
(1992).
22. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463,
2465 (2004) (describing and criticizing the view that plea bargains “result in outcomes roughly as fair
as trial outcomes” because “the likelihood of conviction at trial and the likely post-trial sentence largely
determine plea bargains”).
23. Id. at 2470–72; Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 804 (2003).
24. See Richman, supra note 23, at 804.
25. United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); see also id. at 419–20
(“[F]ederal prosecutors exercise their discretion by reference to a factor that passes in the night with
culpability: whether the defendant pleads guilty.”); Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the
Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1046 (2006).
26. Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1089, 1131 (2013)
(discussing the plea pressures for misdemeanor defendants and advocating for more trials); Michelle
Alexander, Opinion, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system.html [http://perma.cc/UF5
3-VPN6] (advocating for a large-scale refusal to plea bargain); see also Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse
Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 183 (2014) (discussing how the criminal
justice system has grown more efficient in processing cases, and raising the possibility that these
efficiency gains come at the expense of competing values, including accuracy).
27. R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 24 (2012), http://www.courtstatistics.org//media/Microsites/
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may have little desire or ability to seek a lengthy sentence.28 Rather than
threatening harsher sanctions, prosecutors might offer a “string of ever-sweeter
plea offers” as the trial date approaches, knowing that for the defendant the
hassle of seeking a trial could outweigh its benefits.29 Consider the case of
Bronx, New York City resident Michailon Rue, who had to appear in court
seven times over the course of fifteen months to contest misdemeanor marijuana
charges.30 The case ultimately was dismissed on speedy trial grounds but only
after the repeated court appearances cost him his $17-an-hour job as a mainte-
nance worker.31
When defendants face the “time, effort, money, and opportunities lost as a
direct result of being caught up in the [lower court criminal justice] system”—
what Malcolm Feeley described as “process costs” in his seminal 1979 study—
many make a rational decision to accept a quick plea rather than proceed to
trial.32 If a defendant weighs the formal punishment against much more severe
process costs, a “misdemeanor defendant, even if innocent, usually is well
advised to waive every available procedural protection (including the right to
counsel) and to plead guilty at the earliest possible opportunity.”33 As Feeley
put it, in the lower courts, the “process is the punishment.”34
In a pair of recent articles, Issa Kohler-Hausmann further refines this pic-
ture.35 Drawing on a multiyear study of New York City misdemeanor courts,
Kohler-Hausmann demonstrates that quick, seemingly minor pleas can carry
hidden costs.36 A first-time offender might be offered a quick disposition such
Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSP_DEC.ashx [http://perma.cc/HQ5P-XLCX] (showing that misdemean-
ors significantly outnumber felonies in the criminal caseloads of seventeen selected states); R. LAFOUN-
TAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008
STATE COURT CASELOADS 47 (2010), http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages//media/Microsites/Files/
CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx [http://perma.cc/4PWV-5BNS] (showing that misdemeanor cases consti-
tute an “overwhelming majority of criminal caseloads”); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter:
Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 280–82 (2011).
28. Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1148–49 (2008).
29. William Glaberson, In Misdemeanor Cases, Long Waits for Elusive Trials, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/nyregion/justice-denied-for-misdemeanor-cases-trials-are-
elusive.html [http://perma.cc/B8MD-W2GL].
30. Id.
31. These delays are not atypical of Bronx courts. Id.
32. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL
COURT 30–31 (1979).
33. Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the
Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 953 (1983); see also Bowers, supra note 28, at 1136
(“If the defendant can get a plea to a misdemeanor and time served, then the process constitutes the
whole punishment.”).
34. FEELEY, supra note 32.
35. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611
(2014) [hereinafter Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice]; Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor
Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 AM. J. SOC. 351 (2013) [hereinafter Kohler-Hausmann,
Misdemeanor Justice].
36. See Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 35, at 644–46; Kohler-Hausmann, Misde-
meanor Justice, supra note 35, at 366–68.
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as an ACD, but once that disposition is entered, it becomes a “mark” that comes
to hold independent significance.37 If the defendant is arrested again, prosecu-
tors seek a more severe penalty based on the existence of the prior mark rather
than on the strength of the evidence in a given case.38
Thus, defendants who contest petty charges face significant process costs.
But they also face additional hidden costs within the criminal justice system if
they accept the plea.
B. RESPONDING TO COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
Even beyond the criminal justice penalties, arrested individuals now can also
expect to experience a host of additional state-imposed penalties. The formal
criminal penalty constitutes just one aspect of the punishment. From the mo-
ment of arrest, criminal records create a cascade of noncriminal consequences.
Perhaps the best known are felony bans that affect constitutional rights such as
those that prohibit felons from voting,39 serving on juries,40 or carrying fire-
arms.41 But the consequences of contact with the criminal justice system reach
much further.42 The American Bar Association currently estimates 44,000 state
and federal collateral consequences of conviction exist nationwide.43 This does
not even begin to account for the civil consequences that attach only to arrests
or for the discretionary consequences that may be triggered as a result of
employer background checks.44 An informed defendant would weigh the penal-
37. See Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 35, at 644–46; Kohler-Hausmann, Misde-
meanor Justice, supra note 35, at 367–70.
38. See Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 35, at 646; Kohler-Hausmann, Misde-
meanor Justice, supra note 35, at 369–70.
39. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELON DISENFRAN-
CHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 1 (2012), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_State_
Level_Estimates_of_Felon_Disen_2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/8RJE-LMHR] (estimating that 2.5% of
eligible voters are barred from voting because of a criminal record); see also MARIE GOTTSCHALK,
CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2 (2015) (describing the impact of
criminal convictions in disenfranchising one out of every forty potential voters); JAMES B. JACOBS, THE
ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 250–52 (2015) (discussing the effects of felon disenfranchisement).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2012).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
42. Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral Consequences, 100 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214–15 (2010) (“At no point in United States history have collateral
consequences been as expansive and entrenched as they are today.”).
43. Office of Justice Programs, National Inventory of Collateral Consequences, NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF JUSTICE (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/pages/collateral-consequences-inventory.
aspx [https://perma.cc/DR3K-SZQS].
44. For a discussion of how arrests alone can impact decisions relating to immigration, employment,
housing, and education, see Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2015). For
discussions of employer background checks, see MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM,
THE NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, 65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”: THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 15 (2011), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/65_
Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf [http://perma.cc/6X5Z-VQFP]; U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT
DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 1, 12 (2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/
guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf [http://perma.cc/TCQ5-HVK].
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ties attached to having an open arrest—the punishing process, as well as the
likelihood that the arrest will pose a barrier to finding employment or receiving
public benefits—against the penalties, both civil and criminal, triggered by the
conviction.
Collateral consequences attach even to minor criminal records. Certain misde-
meanor convictions bar defendants from moving in with or even visiting family
in public housing.45 Some states ban those with misdemeanor convictions from
working as home health aids or in facilities that serve the disabled.46 Misde-
meanor domestic violence convictions can disrupt custody arrangements.47
Minor crimes, such as public urination, can result in inclusion in a state’s sex
offender registry.48 Even arrests alone can result in the suspension of a profes-
sional license or lead to eviction from public housing.49 Minor arrests can
trigger fees (both civil and criminal), and if the defendant cannot pay, she can
expect to face additional punishment.50
These types of collateral consequences raise several related problems. Whereas
some collateral consequences are closely related to the underlying crime and
respond to a pressing and specific public safety problem, others are disproportion-
ate, imposed without procedural protections, and create arbitrary and inconsis-
tent public policy. 51
As a general matter, proportionality reflects the principle “that larger harms
imposed by government should be justified by more weighty reasons and that
more severe transgressions of the law be more harshly sanctioned than less
45. 42 U.S.C. § 13661(c) (2012); THE BRONX DEFS., THE CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN
NEW YORK STATE 2 (2014), http://www.bronxdefenders.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Consequences-
of-Criminal-Proceedings-Aug2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/PTN9-AC3Q]; Fox Butterfield, Freed from
Prison, but Still Paying a Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/29/us/
freed-from-prison-but-still-paying-a-penalty.html [http://perma.cc/N9RU-RV4B].
46. Roberts, supra note 27, at 299.
47. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 705A (2016) (rebuttable presumption against custody); FLA.
STAT. § 61.13 (2015); ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THREE-
MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 19 (2011); Deborah Ahrens, Note,
Not in Front of the Children: Prohibition on Child Custody as Civil Branding for Criminal Activity, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 737, 754–55 (2000).
48. See, e.g., In re Birch, 515 P.2d 12, 13–14 (Cal. 1973); John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”:
The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 28 (2013) (“[E]very state now has an
online sex offender registry, a system of community notification, and a system of exchanging informa-
tion with other states and the federal government. In terms of scope, registries have expanded to include
those convicted of even very minor misdemeanor offenses.” (footnotes omitted)).
49. See Jain, supra note 44, at 840–41; see also SARGENT SHRIVER NAT’L CTR. ON POVERTY LAW, WHEN
DISCRETION MEANS DENIAL: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL RECORDS BARRIERS TO FEDERALLY
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING vi–vii (2015), http://povertylaw.org/sites/default/files/images/publications/WDMD-
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C7M-VHBA].
50. See generally Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277
(2014).
51. See Project Description, ABA NATIONAL INVENTORY OF THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES CONVIC-
TION, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/description/ [https://perma.cc/S9CS-LA6U] (last vis-
ited Dec. 25, 2015) (noting that some collateral consequences serve a legitimate function, such as
keeping firearms from violent offenders or responding to particular public safety concerns).
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severe ones.”52 Theories of deterrence or retribution are premised on the idea
that the punishment ought to fit the crime.53 But collateral consequences can far
outstrip the criminal penalty, and they can function as a punishment long after
any formal criminal penalty has been served.54 If a relatively short criminal
sentence serves the aim of the criminal law, additional civil penalties run the
risk of “piling on”; they run the risk of creating too much punishment.55 This
dynamic is particularly troubling in the context of the broader criticism that
U.S. criminal justice itself is overly punitive56 and disproportionately burdens
the poor and racial minorities.57
Collateral consequences can be administered in a way that lacks basic
procedural fairness. Criminal punishment, the “heavy artillery of society,”
triggers special procedural protections.58 Defendants who accept pleas must at a
minimum have a “full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its
consequence.”59 But state-imposed civil penalties do not trigger similar proce-
dural protections even though they may function exactly like criminal punish-
ment. Immigrant defendants, for instance, may continue to be held in state-run
52. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3098
(2015).
53. For a discussion and critique of proportionality jurisprudence, see Youngjae Lee, The Constitu-
tional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677 (2005).
54. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012) (describing collateral consequences as a new form of
“civil death”—a “form of punishment” that “extinguish[es] most civil rights of a person convicted of a
crime and largely put[s] that person outside the law’s protection”). See also Colgan, supra note 50, for
the argument that certain fines are disproportionate.
55. Christopher Uggen & Robert Stewart, Piling On: Collateral Consequences and Community
Supervision, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2015) (“In American football, ‘piling on’ . . . is illegal
because it is unnecessary, slows the progress of the game, and often results in serious injury.” (footnote
omitted)).
56. See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS
POLICING 8 (2001) (criticizing “order-maintenance” policing strategies that focus on low-level arrests as
ineffective and arguing that they have become popular because they conceptualize “conduct that was
once merely offensive or annoying” as “conduct that causes serious crime”); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERN-
ING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A
CULTURE OF FEAR (2007) (arguing that crime-control rationales are too often used to legitimate
regulatory decisions); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003) (providing a historical legal account of how certain
“liberal” features of American culture have led to more punitive penal policies than those in Europe).
57. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discre-
tion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 26–38 (1998) (offering examples of discrimination against African-
Americans throughout the criminal justice process as compared to whites); Jeffrey Fagan & Garth
Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 457, 477–78 (2000) (showing a vast and disproportionate increase in misdemeanor arrests of
minorities in poor urban areas under New York City’s stop and frisk policy); Michael Pinard, Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
457, 470, 490 (2010).
58. Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 9 (2006); see also Francis A. Allen,
The Morality of Means: Three Problems in Criminal Sanctions, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 737, 738 (1981).
59. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243–44 (1969).
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jails after their prison sentence is complete, but they may never be informed
about the civil penalty.60 To be sure, the motives for placing someone in civil
versus criminal detention may be distinct.61 But from the perspective of the
defendant, the distinction is formal at best. Plea bargaining reflects the assump-
tion that defendants choose pleas because they provide the opportunity to secure
sanctions at the lowest cost to themselves.62 Thus, defendants must at minimum
understand the penalties triggered by a plea for this choice to be meaningful.
Defendants who lack information about the state-imposed consequences that
will result from their conviction—regardless of whether they are codified in
civil or criminal law—miss a crucial piece of information, one that might affect
their decision-making calculus.
Another related concern is arbitrariness. Collateral consequences can function
as overbroad and imprecise regulatory proxies. Lawmakers “overcriminalize”
when they impose criminal penalties that exceed a reasonable judgment about
fit or appropriateness.63 As Jonathan Simon puts it, lawmakers “govern through
crime” when they link public policy decisions to crime control, even when those
decisions are motivated by factors other than their impact on crime.64 Civil
regulators then use criminal records—some of which may be overbroad to begin
with—as proxies for their own decision making.65 This trend is also driven by
technological changes that allow for quick and easy access to criminal back-
ground checks.66 When overbroad collateral consequences attach to overbroad
criminal records and when regulators can easily and inexpensively access
criminal record history, the resulting system can stray from the intended regula-
tory agenda. The underlying criminal record is used as a proxy, even though it
may not correlate in a meaningful way to risk assessment or to the relevant
60. See DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (2009) (reporting that as of 2009, fifty percent of those in immigration custody
were housed in local jails); see also Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 42, 45 (2010) (discussing how certain convictions trigger mandatory immigration
detention after defendants complete their criminal sentence).
61. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 96–97 (2003) (holding that a sex offender registry is not
“punishment” and discussing different factors that might go to punitive intent); Wallace v. State, 905
N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009) (holding that a civil sex offender registration requirement functions as a
form of punishment).
62. Daniel C. Richman, Bargaining About Future Jeopardy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1181, 1187 (1996)
(“Every defendant facing criminal charges seeks repose: to end his exposure to criminal sanctions at the
least cost to himself.”).
63. See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 714 (2005)
(arguing that “the criminal sanction should be reserved for specific behaviors and mental states that are
so wrongful and harmful to their direct victims or the general public as to justify the official
condemnation and denial of freedom that flow from a guilty verdict”); see also Stuntz, supra note 19.
64. See SIMON, supra note 56, at 4 (arguing that the “category of crime” is deployed strategically “to
legitimate interventions that have other motivations”).
65. See Jain, supra note 44; James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and
Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 177 (2008).
66. See, e.g., Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 65, at 179–80; Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine &
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 804 (2010).
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regulatory priority.67
Immigration scholars have made the argument, for instance, that overbroad
definitions of “aggravated felonies” and crimes involving “moral turpitude”
now lead to deportation.68 Labels such as “aggravated felon” or “crime involv-
ing moral turpitude” indicate a focus on those who have committed serious
offenses. But these categories also encompass minor crimes such as turnstile
jumping, hair-pulling, or stealing a video game.69
C. PROMOTING INFORMED PLEA BARGAINING
In recent years, commentators, judges, and policymakers have sharpened
their focus on the procedural fairness problem. A host of nascent public policy
and legal changes are aimed at promoting informed plea bargaining. Until the
2010 Padilla decision, defense attorneys had no obligation to inform defendants
about consequences such as deportation. Most courts held that a defendant need
only be informed of the “direct” consequences of a plea but not of the
“collateral” consequences, with the prevailing distinction turning on whether
the consequence is “definite, immediate, and largely automatic.”70 In practice,
this line is “mythical,” with significant variation in how courts characterize the
same consequence.71 Some courts applying the collateral–direct distinction
67. Jain, supra note 44 (discussing the use of arrests as a proxy for immigration officials, employers,
public housing providers, and others); see also Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New
Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449
(1992) (describing a shift away from punishing individuals and toward managing aggregates of
dangerous groups through a focus on surveillance and other forms of monitoring).
68. Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 483–84 (2007) (describing the “aggravated
felony” as a “colossus” that “has accounted for the steadiest and most expansive growth in the range of
crimes that give rise to removal”); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deporta-
tion Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1939–40 (2000) (noting
that “a crime need not be either aggravated or a felony” to qualify as an aggravated felony); see also
Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 574 (2010) (“We do not usually think of a ten-day
sentence for the unauthorized possession of a trivial amount of a prescription drug as an ‘aggravated
felony.’”).
69. See Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553, 560–61 (2013); see also
Cade, supra note 7, at 1759 (collecting examples of minor criminal offenses that have been considered
aggravated felonies for deportation purposes). Removal decisions have historically been based on “the
statutory definition of the offense of conviction, not to the particulars of an alien’s behavior.” Mellouli
v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986 (2015); see also Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal
Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1701,
1746 (2011). For instance, theft is a crime of moral turpitude. Thus, when turnstile jumping is defined
as a “theft of services,” it can trigger deportation. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii),
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2012); Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
70. Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that “[t]he distinction between direct
and collateral consequences” turns on whether the consequence is “definite, immediate, and largely
automatic”); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 755 (1970) (holding that defendant
must be informed of the “direct consequences” of a plea); Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d
1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973).
71. Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky: From Punishment
to Regulation, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 87, 96–98 (2011) (describing the collateral consequences
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have held that guilty pleas are valid where defendants were unaware of collat-
eral consequences such as the loss of benefits,72 revocation of a professional
license or prior job,73 or the possibility of lifelong civil commitment.74
In Padilla, the U.S. Supreme Court modified the collateral consequences
doctrine. The majority opinion characterized deportation as an “enmeshed”
penalty that is so “intimately related” to the criminal charges that it is “‘most
difficult’ to divorce the penalty from the conviction.”75 Because deportation
operates as a quasi-punishment, the Court held that defense counsel must advise
defendants about certain clearly predictable immigration consequences of crimi-
nal convictions.76
The Padilla opinion represented a significant change in doctrine. It estab-
lished a legal standard that reflected underlying changes in professional practice
standards. As the Court noted, leading defense attorneys—such as those that
have a self-described focus on “holistic,” “community-centered,” or “participa-
tory” defense—already incorporate collateral consequences into their defense
and advocacy strategy.77 Their basic vision of advocacy focuses not only on
doctrine); Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV.
670, 679–80 (2008) (describing circuit splits over the meaning of “direct” versus “collateral”
consequences).
72. See United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir. 2012) (discussing loss of federal
benefits).
73. See Kratt v. Garvey, 342 F.3d 475, 485 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing loss of a license); United
States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1072–73 (3d Cir. 1976) (discussing loss of job).
74. See United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing civil commitment after
completing criminal sentence); Steele, 365 F.3d at 18 (discussing potential lifetime commitment as a
“sexually dangerous person”).
75. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365–66 (2010) (quoting United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35,
38 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
76. Id. at 369.
77. For a sampling of public defender offices that focus on addressing collateral consequences, see,
for example, BROOKLYN DEF. SERVS., http://bds.org/ [http://perma.cc/7T8Q-JYFM] (last visited Dec. 25,
2015) (providing expertise relating to family defense, civil justice, and immigration in addition to
criminal defense); Explore Holistic Defense, BRONX DEFS., http://www.bronxdefenders.org/who-we-are/
how-we-work/ [http://perma.cc/73GH-BAAZ] (last visited Dec. 24, 2015); Immigration Practice Group,
WIS. ST. PUB. DEF., http://wispd.org/index.php/legal-resources/specialty-practices/immigration-practive
[http://perma.cc/PXQ3-9HYM] (last visited Dec. 25, 2015) (separate immigration practice); Civil Legal
Services Division, PUB. DEF. SERV. FOR DIST. COLUMBIA, http://pdsdc.org/about-us/legal-services [http://
perma.cc/TY35-ZWTT] (last visited Dec. 24, 2015) (providing immigration, housing, and family
services); NEIGHBORHOOD DEF. SERV. HARLEM, http://www.ndsny.org/ [http://perma.cc/7QSG-EAJM]
(last visited Dec. 24, 2015) (providing prearrest services, family practice, housing advocacy, immigra-
tion advocacy, and indigent defense); Our Mission & Story, ARCHCITY DEFS., http://www.
archcitydefenders.org/who-we-are/our-mission-story/ [http://perma.cc/E93A-ZRMH] (last visited Dec.
25, 2015) (providing “[h]olistic [d]efense” to address civil needs arising out of contact with the
criminal justice system); Who We Are, KNOX CTY. PUB. DEFS. COMMUNITY LAW OFF., http://www.pdknox.
org/who-we-are/ [http://perma.cc/NY4Z-VA84] (last visited Dec. 24, 2015) (embracing a model of
“holistic” defense).
For discussions of these types of approaches, see, for example, Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration,
122 YALE L.J. 2282, 2297–300 (2013) (discussing the importance of “immigration expertise” when
counseling criminal defendants); Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word, supra note 7, at 490–91; Kim
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success at trial, but also on ascertaining collateral consequences and managing
the impact of a criminal record in the way that matters the most for the
defendant.78 This approach focuses on how the criminal record will impact
the defendant, as opposed to formal legal categories of civil versus criminal.
Defenders view managing the criminal record—in a way that allows the defen-
dant to work, maintain public benefits, obtain student loans, and attend school—as
a critical part of their agenda.
Plea bargaining plays an important role in this process. Due to redundant
criminal codes, defendants in petty cases often can be charged with multiple
crimes.79 Out of this potential menu of charges, it may be possible to strategi-
cally plead guilty only to those that do not carry an immediate risk of
a collateral consequence.
A recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case illustrates the potential of this
approach. Joseph Abraham was sixty-seven when he resigned from his job as a
school teacher and was charged with four equivalent and overlapping misdemean-
ors.80 During the plea negotiation, the prosecutor sought a guilty plea to one or
two charges and a penalty of three years’ probation.81 Only after entering his
plea did Abraham learn that he had pled to the only offense that also mandated
permanent forfeiture of his pension—an additional penalty of $1500 a month
for the rest of his life.82
This case illustrates why informed consideration of collateral consequences
matters; informed defendants may well prefer outcomes that deviate from what
they would choose if only the criminal consequence was on the table. In the
immigration context, for instance, an immigrant defendant convicted of misde-
meanor shoplifting charges might prefer a six-month sentence of actual prison
time over a twelve-month suspended sentence. In the absence of collateral
consequences, the suspended sentence would be better, at least if the defendant
reasonably expected never to spend a day in prison. But a sentence of one year,
regardless of whether the entirety of the sentence is suspended, renders the
Taylor-Thompson, Taking It to the Streets, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 153, 155–57 (2004)
(arguing that defenders should focus on identifying and responding to common needs among clients,
rather than focusing more narrowly on individualized representation).
78. Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word, supra note 7, at 490 (holistic defense is designed “to serve a
client as a whole person—a person with complex needs, a family, and who is a part of a community—
rather than a case or a legal issue”); Robin Steinberg & David Feige, Cultural Revolution: Transform-
ing the Public Defender’s Office, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123, 123–24 (2004) (arguing that an
“obsessive focus on the trial as the crowning achievement of the public defender leads inescapably to
the privileging of the canny trial attorney over the caring and effective advocate focused on both the
client’s legal and extra-legal needs”).
79. Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 369, 369
(2010) (arguing that “broad and overlapping criminal laws let police and prosecutors decide who
actually deserves to be charged and with what crimes”).
80. See Pennsylvania v. Abraham, 62 A.3d 343, 344 (Pa. 2012); Brief of the Appellee at 1, Abraham,
62 A.3d 343 (No. 36 WAP 2010), 2011 WL 2646523, at *1.
81. Brief of the Appellee, supra note 80, at 2–3.
82. Id. at 3–4.
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shoplifting conviction an “aggravated felony” that carries the risk of deporta-
tion.83 Given these dynamics, “[p]articularly with misdemeanor charges, many
[defendants] would rationally choose even a short term of incarceration to avoid
some harsh ‘collateral’ consequences.”84
Informed plea bargaining is no panacea, of course. Although professional
practice standards have shifted toward providing advice about collateral conse-
quences, indigent defense remains chronically underfunded.85 For many defend-
ers, incorporating advice about collateral consequences poses an untenable
administrative burden. During the Padilla briefing, a number of state prosecu-
tors emphasized the cost associated with providing defendants with information
about collateral consequences. They warned that requiring defense attorneys to
provide advice about immigration consequences would “break the back of the
plea agreement system” because it would require a “‘dream team’ of five or
more lawyers for each indigent defendant.”86
The complaint is justified. It reflects the byzantine network of collateral
consequences that currently exists. Collateral consequences stem from a number
of different legal sources. Even top-tier defense lawyers face significant chal-
lenges in ascertaining, much less navigating, them. The problem is not limited
to state and federal regulations. Some municipalities also disqualify those with
criminal records from engaging in activities such as street vending or driving a
taxi.87 These types of regulations are not codified in any one location, and they
can change if a defendant makes a local move.88 Discretionary consequences—
those that might be triggered by a conviction but are not mandated—also
require significant investigation by defense attorneys.89 There is an enormous
variation in terms of how well defense attorneys are able to respond to collateral
consequences. Similar to Gideon, the most meaningful impact of Padilla might
lie in establishing a minimum baseline of constitutionally adequate professional
practice, even through practices currently fail to comport with that standard.90
83. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2012); United States v. Christopher, 239 F.3d 1191, 1192, 1194
(11th Cir. 2001).
84. THE BRONX DEFS., supra note 45, at 5 (emphasis omitted).
85. Adam M. Gershowitz, Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN. L. REV.
85, 91–100 (2007) (discussing funding deficits in indigent defense).
86. Brief for the States of Louisiana & Alaska et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 1,
11–12, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 2564713 [hereinafter Brief for
States]. See generally Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral,” supra note 7 (discussing the standard
of care required of defense attorneys by Padilla).
87. See Amy P. Meek, Street Vendors, Taxicabs, and Exclusion Zones: The Impact of Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Convictions at the Local Level, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 16–17 (2014).
88. See id. at 17.
89. Defense attorneys also have limited ability to advise about private consequences, such as
employers who use overbroad disqualifications on the basis of criminal records. See RODRIGUEZ &
EMSELLEM, supra note 44, at 1, 15 (discussing job postings identifying a “[c]lean criminal record, no
misdemeanors, no felonies” as a requirement even for jobs such as a diesel mechanic (emphasis
omitted)).
90. Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon v.
Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2152–53 (2013) (“The representation received by most poor people
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Even with information about collateral consequences, defendants may not be
able to strike a better deal.91 Prosecutors are more likely to mitigate if the
charged offense is relatively minor.92 With serious crimes, prosecutors might
find that there is little principled room to recharacterize charges in a way that
does not trigger a noncriminal penalty, given that felonies carry a wide range of
mandatory penalties.93 Prosecutors may also view collateral consequences as
inconsequential if the charges are serious.94 Thus, defendants and prosecutors
may have the most room to negotiate pleas that avoid important collateral
sanctions in the case of minor criminal offenses.
Defendants who seek to plea bargain in light of collateral consequences now
have important new resources at their disposal. Recent public policy measures
reduce the administrative burden associated with understanding the civil conse-
quences of guilty pleas. In 2007, Congress directed the National Institute of
Justice to collect and analyze state-imposed collateral consequences for each
U.S. jurisdiction. This culminated in the 2015 launch of the National Inventory
of Collateral Consequences of Conviction, a database that collects, codes, and
seeks to comprehensively cross-reference collateral consequences in an easily
accessible format. The database allows a user to search an interactive map, enter
the type of conviction in a particular jurisdiction, and view a list of mandatory
or discretionary collateral consequences that might be triggered by state or
federal law.95
A number of public defenders and other organizations now also publish
guides about the collateral consequences of criminal convictions. These re-
sources frequently contain a list of jurisdiction-specific collateral consequences,
as well as guidelines for conducting effective intakes.96 Other new resources
accused of crimes—if they receive any at all—is a far cry from the constitutional requirement of . . .
‘the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings,’ which was established by Gideon v.
Wainwright and its progeny.”).
91. Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1399 (2011)
(“[T]he widespread and routine nature of criminal charging flexibility and the complexity of deporta-
tion statutes do not mean that creative lawyers have a range of options for every case.”).
92. See id. at 1404–05.
93. See id. at 1401 (arguing that, given the gravity of Jose Padilla’s offense—transporting 1000
pounds of marijuana—he is unlikely to be able to negotiate an immigration-safe plea).
94. Some prosecutors make the principled decision not to recharacterize serious charges because of
collateral consequences. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jeff Rosen, Dist. Attorney, to Fellow Prosecutors
4 (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/unit_7b_4_santa_clara_da_policy.pdf [http://perma.
cc/Q243-Q6NZ] (“[C]ollateral consequences are not a relevant or appropriate factor in any case
involving a serious or violent felony . . . .”).
95. See Project Description, NAT’L INVENTORY OF THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION,
http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/description/ [http://perma.cc/RZ9V-XTVA] (last visited Dec.
25, 2015).
96. For a small sampling, see, for example, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS & PUB. DEF. SERV. FOR D.C., INTERNAL EXILE: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION IN
FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS (2009), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cecs/
internalexile.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3AW-D9QJ]; THE BRONX DEFS., supra note 45, at
4–5; COLO. STATE PUB. DEF., THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION: SANCTIONS BEYOND THE SENTENCE UNDER
COLORADO LAW (2014); WASH. DEF. ASS’N, BEYOND THE CONVICTION: WHAT DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN
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include comparative “profiles” of the collateral consequences in each jurisdic-
tion,97 the first treatise on collateral consequences,98 and the 2014 launch of the
Collateral Consequences Resource Center, a nonprofit organization devoted to
providing information about collateral consequences.99 Some states have also
begun efforts to collect and reference all collateral penalties in an easily
accessible location in the state’s criminal code.100
These resources represent an important step toward promoting transparency
and informed plea bargaining. Though these developments are nascent and face
significant hurdles to implementation, they hold the potential to reduce informa-
tion barriers to identifying and incorporating collateral consequences in the plea
bargaining process. The next Part turns to what these dynamics mean for the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
II. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
Prosecutors have received relatively little attention in the literature on collat-
eral consequences. But they are not indifferent to civil penalties. To the con-
trary, informed prosecutors have powerful structural incentives to respond to
collateral consequences, such as their law enforcement priorities, administrative
workloads, relationships with other agencies, interests in achieving horizontal
equity and proportionality, or interests in shaping public policy. Prosecutors
marshal these rationales to engage in three general approaches: collateral mitiga-
tion, collateral enforcement, and the counterbalance model, where prosecutors
require the defendant to agree to a harsher criminal penalty in exchange for
avoiding a collateral outcome. This Part develops these models. My aim in
developing this framework is to show that informed consideration of collateral
consequences can lead prosecutors to take divergent approaches and to high-
light relevant considerations.
A. COLLATERAL MITIGATION MODEL
In the collateral mitigation approach, prosecutors structure the plea to mini-
mize the likelihood of a collateral sanction. If a prosecutor is aware of the
WASHINGTON STATE NEED TO KNOW ABOUT COLLATERAL AND OTHER NON-CONFINEMENT CONSEQUENCES OF
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS (2013), http://www.defensenet.org/resources/publications-1/beyond-the-conviction/
Beyond%20the%20Conviction%20-Updated%20-%202007.pdf [http://perma.cc/7V9T-FN9X].
97. See Margaret Colgate Love, Relief from Collateral Consequences and Restoration of Rights:
State Profiles, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., https://www.nacdl.org/ResourceCenter.aspx?id25412
&libID25381 [https://perma.cc/542M-5UR9] (last visited Feb. 24, 2016) (offering “a collection of
individual downloadable documents that profile the law and practice in each U.S. jurisdiction relating
to relief from the collateral consequences of conviction”).
98. See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & CECELIA M. KLINGELE, COLLATERAL CONSE-
QUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2013).
99. See About Us, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR., http://ccresourcecenter.org/about-the-
collateral-consequences-resource-center/ [https://perma.cc/4V2L-SDRM] (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
100. Love, supra note 71, at 118–21 (describing the reform and stating that Ohio and North Carolina
have begun this effort).
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potential collateral consequence—its scope, severity, and impact—then the
prosecutor exercises her discretion to modify the charges or drop them
altogether.101
Administrative efficiency provides a powerful rationale for this approach.
Prosecutors in the criminal justice system balance competing roles and interests,
including the role of an administrator who seeks “to dispose of each case in the
fastest, most efficient manner in the interest of getting his and the court’s work
done.”102 In some cases, if defendants are aware of the collateral consequence,
they will turn down a plea they would otherwise accept and opt for a much
more time consuming trial.103 As the former president of the National District
Attorneys’ Association noted, in some cases the only palatable plea for a
defendant is one that avoids a collateral penalty.104 Prosecutors who want to
avoid unnecessary administrative burden thus have an incentive to mitigate the
collateral consequence.
Prosecutors have incentives to mitigate when the collateral consequence is
disproportionate—when it creates a harm that is not justified by any theory of
punishment, such as deterrence or retribution. In taking this approach, the
prosecutor focuses on the effect the collateral consequence will have on the
individual defendant. In exercising discretion, prosecutors weigh familiar equi-
table considerations. Prosecutors routinely consider factors other than the defen-
dant’s level of culpability and the seriousness of the offense when assessing
what penalty is appropriate; they also weigh equitable factors, such as how the
penalty will affect the defendant’s ability to work or go to school.105 As New
York County District Attorney Cyrus Vance, Jr. put it, prosecutors are aware that
every criminal conviction can have “devastating consequences” for the defen-
dant.106 A prosecutor who exercises discretion to reduce the collateral conse-
quence is similar to one who makes a sentence concession based on how the
101. Chin & Holmes, supra note 5, at 718–19 (discussing how “[i]dentifying and explaining
collateral consequences to the prosecutor” may influence whether the prosecutor brings charges at all or
the counts to which the prosecution accepts a plea).
102. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 52
(1968).
103. Robert M.A. Johnson, Collateral Consequences, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2001, at 32.
104. See id.
105. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1706–07 (2010) (“Prosecutors base discretionary bargaining decisions on
prior record; employment, familial, and educational status and history; the defendant’s character; and
his perceived motivation for this and other criminal acts.”); Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense
Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 100 (1995) (“To negotiate
effectively, defense counsel must . . . personalize or humanize the defendant when talking with the
prosecutor. Defense counsel who is unaware or unprepared when the prosecutor inquires about
the defendant’s present job status or work history may seriously undermine the effort to obtain a
favorable sentencing concession.” (footnote omitted)); see also Alschuler, supra note 102, at 53.
106. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., Dist. Attorney, Keynote Address at the Howard Law Journal Symposium
(Oct. 29, 2011), in 54 HOW. L.J. 539, 543 (2011) (“[I]n any case we handle, the consequences of
conviction and sentencing can have devastating consequences for an offender, and even for innocent
parties such as the defendant’s family.”).
1216 [Vol. 104:1197THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
penalty will impact the defendant. In both cases, the prosecutor assesses whether
the impact of the conviction—regardless of whether it is civil or criminal—
serves the state’s interest in punishment, or whether it creates too much harm.
Prosecutors who negotiate collateral consequences need not reduce the over-
all criminal penalty. In the simplest case, the prosecutor makes a “lateral move,”
where the criminal penalty remains unchanged.107 Redundant criminal codes
create the possibility of recharacterizing charges in a way that retains the
criminal sanction but avoids the collateral consequence. With an immigrant
defendant, for instance, the prosecutor could accept a plea for misdemeanor
simple assault rather than misdemeanor intentional assault; in criminal law
terms, the penalties are equivalent, but only the intentional assault conviction
carries the risk of deportation.108 A prosecutor might also make a minor
sentence adjustment, such as a sentence of 364 days rather than one year.109 The
single-day sentence adjustment can avoid categorization as an aggravated felon
for immigration purposes, and thus avoid removal.110
If prosecutors view collateral consequences as disproportionate, they may
also make a downward adjustment or drop the charges altogether.111 Given the
choice of withholding penalties altogether or triggering disproportionate ones,
some prosecutors make the principled decision to choose no punishment. This
dynamic occurs when the only available sentences are too severe; prosecutors
must choose between “overkill”—inflicting unjustifiably severe sanctions—and
“nullification”—imposing no sanctions when some penalty is justified.112
McGregor Smyth, the former head of the Bronx Defenders’ civil advocacy
project, describes this dynamic in practice and explains that in some cases,
prosecutors view the nullification approach as the only option that comports
107. See Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of Justice for
Noncitizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1, 23 (2012); Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens:
An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1188 (2013) (discussing lateral
moves in the immigration context).
108. See In re Solon, 24 I. & N. DEC. 239, 244–45 (B.I.A. 2007) (explaining that intentional assault
is considered a crime of “moral turpitude” but simple assault is not); see also Altman, supra note 107,
at 23 (describing defense interventions aimed at reaching an immigration-safe lateral move).
109. See Altman, supra note 107, at 23. Other actors also make these types of modifications to
disrupt immigration consequences. See, e.g., State v. Quintero Morelos, 137 P.3d 114, 116 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2006) (sentencing judge reduced sentence from 365 days to 364 days to avoid deportation).
Recently, the state of California modified its criminal code to define a misdemeanor as punishable by a
maximum of 364 days so as to avoid the prospect of mandatory deportation following a relatively
minor offense. S.B. 1310, 2013–2014 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (creating CAL. PENAL CODE § 18.5
(West 2015), which reads: “Every offense which is prescribed by any law of the state to be punishable
by imprisonment in a county jail up to or not exceeding one year shall be punishable by imprisonment
in a county jail for a period not to exceed 364 days.”).
110. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2012); United States v. Christopher, 239 F.3d 1191, 1194 (11th
Cir. 2001).
111. Chin & Holmes, supra note 5, at 719 (citing examples of guidance illustrating how “[t]he
impact of collateral consequences due to a criminal conviction can, on occasion, be used to persuade
the prosecutor to prosecute for a lesser charge or to decline a case altogether”).
112. Allen, supra note 58, at 739.
2016] 1217PROSECUTING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
with basic principles of fairness. He writes, “In our experience, prosecutors and
judges respond best to consequences that offend their basic sense of fairness—
consequences that are absurd or disproportionate, or that affect innocent family
members.”113 He offers this example of a successful negotiation:
Juan R. was charged with a drug crime, and the prosecutor refused to agree to
any plea below a misdemeanor. Juan, however, was disabled and lived in
public housing, and a misdemeanor would result in his eviction. Knowing the
public housing rules on termination for criminal activity, the defense attorney
convinced the prosecutor to consent to a non-criminal disposition, and Juan
kept his home.114
Some prosecutors issue office-wide guidance for engaging in collateral mitiga-
tion in the interests of justice.115 A 2011 memorandum distributed to prosecu-
tors in Santa Clara County, California, cites Padilla as supporting a “dominant
paradigm” that “prosecutors should consider both collateral and direct conse-
quences of a settlement in order to discharge our highest duty to pursue
justice.”116 The American Bar Association (ABA) Standards for Criminal Jus-
tice on Collateral Sanctions and Disqualification of Convicted Persons also
offers guidance to this effect. It indicates that sentencing courts ought to
consider “applicable collateral sanctions in determining an offender’s overall
sentence.”117 The commentary further explains that “the sentencing court should
ensure that the totality of the penalty is not unduly severe and that it does not
give rise to undue disparity.”118
It is important to note that prosecutors who adopt this approach may not see
themselves as making a choice between no punishment and disproportionate
penalties. Kohler-Hausmann, for instance, observed a collateral mitigation dy-
113. Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word, supra note 7, at 494–95 (describing the approach of the
Bronx Defenders); see also Altman, supra note 107, at 3–4, 35 (describing advocacy strategy focused
on presenting deportation as an unjust and disproportionate penalty for a marijuana conviction).
114. Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word, supra note 7, at 495.
115. Formal policies are relatively rare. Eagly, supra note 107, at 1154 & n.104 (reporting that out of
fifty requests for policies to county prosecutor offices with the highest noncitizen counts in their
criminal justice systems, only seven reported adopting a formal policy that expressly permits prosecu-
tors to consider immigration consequences of conviction, and two county prosecutor offices (Cochise,
Arizona and San Mateo, California) reported adopting policies that “explicitly prohibit prosecutors
from considering immigration status or future deportation during the course of plea bargaining”); Kay
L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1119, 1133–34
(2012) (discussing the lack of formal policies within prosecutors’ offices relative to larger law firms or
administrative agencies).
116. Memorandum from Jeff Rosen, Dist. Attorney, to Fellow Prosecutors, supra note 94, at 2
(emphasis omitted); see also Altman, supra note 107, at 26 (discussing the Santa Clara memorandum).
117. AM. BAR ASS’N STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS STANDARD 19-2.4(a), at 3 (3d ed. 2004); see also Chin &
Holmes, supra note 5, at 697.
118. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICA-
TION OF CONVICTED PERSONS standard 19-2.4 cmt., at 29–30 (3d ed. 2004).
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namic in New York misdemeanor courts, but she suggests that prosecutors fold
an awareness of the collateral consequence into their initial assessment of the
case.119 Prosecutors exercise discretion both by offering substantively better
deals and by using their power over the clock to offer speedier dispositions if
the criminal case is creating a barrier to employment. She writes:
Many criminal justice actors are cognizant of the potential collateral conse-
quences of even the most minor and short-lived markers. Debbie, a longtime
supervisor in the D.A.’s office, explained: “A huge factor that we always take
into consideration is whether or not the person is employed. We don’t want to
see people losing their jobs, especially not in today’s economy. We do not
penalize someone for not having a job, but it certainly is a plus and we always
take it into consideration in forming dispositions.”120
In terms of end results, the approach taken by Debbie, the prosecutor, is the
same as that taken by the prosecutor in the case of Juan R., the disabled
defendant in public housing. Both prosecutors found the collateral penalty
disproportionate and unjustified. But Debbie does not view her office as chang-
ing its standard practice in response to disproportionate collateral consequences.
Rather, the standard practice is designed to adapt to collateral consequences.
This approach illustrates how deeply embedded collateral penalties can be in a
system of plea bargaining. Although collateral consequences are not imposed
until after the criminal conviction has been entered, awareness of the civil
penalties can influence prosecutorial behavior at the outset of their decision-
making process.
In an important comparative study, Ingrid Eagly found significant variation in
how criminal justice officials—prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, jail person-
nel, and others—approach immigration outcomes in three of the nation’s highest
volume urban sites for criminal immigration enforcement.121 In Los Angeles,
for instance, criminal justice officials do not make an affirmative effort to learn
about immigration status. Police do not inquire about immigration violations,
judges do not ask about immigration status, and prosecutors do not purposefully
pull immigration information.122 But, with regard to plea bargaining, a “central
piece” of the approach is that prosecutors take into account collateral conse-
quences.123 For over a decade, deputy prosecutors have been authorized to
depart from standard plea bargains in minor cases if defendants will experience
119. See Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice, supra note 35, at 373.
120. Id.
121. See Eagly, supra note 107, at 1131–35 (identifying three distinct approaches to immigration
status, characterized as “alienage-neutral,” “illegal-alien-punishment,” and “immigration-enforcement”
in Los Angeles County, California, Harris County, Texas, and Maricopa County, Arizona, respectively).
122. Id. at 1157.
123. Id. at 1163.
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consequences such as deportation or the loss of a professional license.124
Prosecutors include the collateral consequence alongside other factors, such as
prior criminal history and significance of the charged offense, in exercising
discretion.125
In addition to administrative efficiency and proportionality incentives, prosecu-
tors also have core law enforcement-related incentives to mitigate. This ap-
proach views mitigation as part of a broader strategy designed to encourage
community members to come forward, report crime, serve as witnesses, and
cooperate with law enforcement.126 This conception of crime control is grounded
in the vision that law enforcement works best when communities view law
enforcement as responsive to their concerns.127 In the past two decades, law
enforcement strategies designed to promote local trust and cooperation with
police and prosecutors have come under the general label of “community
prosecution” and “community policing.” These strategies seek to identify and
respond to the public safety concerns of local communities.128 The approach
focuses on preventing as well as punishing crime, and it depends on strategies
such as reaching out to businesses, schools, and community associations.129 The
theory is that if communities see law enforcement as responsive to their
concerns, they are more likely to obey the law and help enforce it.130
Prosecutors who adopt this approach consider whether a collateral penalty
that puts a defendant out of work or triggers deportation harms the relationship
between law enforcement and the community. Some local law enforcement
agencies cite precisely these types of concerns when opposing federal efforts to
tie immigration enforcement to local policing decisions. As one police leader
testified before Congress, “To do our job we must have the trust and respect of
the communities we serve. . . . When immigrants come to view their local [law
enforcement agencies] with distrust because they fear deportation, it creates
conditions that encourage criminals to prey upon victims and witnesses alike.”131
124. Id. at 1163–64 (discussing immigration consequences and noting that prosecutors adopt a
similar approach for licensing).
125. Id. at 1164–65.
126. See Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125, 1151 (2005) (“In
jurisdictions committed to the new prosecution model, the goals of the prosecutors’ office in-
clude . . . reducing and preventing crime, addressing public disorder and misdemeanor offenses, and
strengthening bonds with citizens.”).
127. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3–4 (1990) (distinguishing an instrumental view
of obedience—people obey the law because they fear getting caught—from the view that people obey
the law because they believe it is procedurally fair).
128. See Thomas J. Miles, Does the “Community Prosecution” Strategy Reduce Crime? A Test of
Chicago’s Experience, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 117, 118, 123 (2014).
129. Id. at 121–22.
130. See Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1629–30
(2002) (“[I]deal community-policing officers are flexible generalists willing to help community resi-
dents solve crime problems or other noncrime problems that residents believe to lead to unsafe
conditions in their neighborhoods.”).
131. Oversight of the Administration’s Misdirected Immigration Enforcement Policies: Examining
the Impact on Public Safety and Honoring the Victims: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
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On a related note, prosecutors have incentives to mitigate when the collateral
consequence itself is criminogenic. The former District Attorney of Kings
County, Brooklyn, explained his decision to support efforts to provide former
inmates with access to social services as grounded in the “ultimate” law
enforcement goal of increasing public safety.132 Alameda County District Attor-
ney Nancy O’Malley endorsed the collateral mitigation approach as creating
potential “to help people stay or get into a position where they have the ability
to be successful.”133 Prosecutors who view lack of access to jobs or housing as
root causes of crime regard collateral mitigation as a necessary strategy for
crime control.
In practice, these motivations likely overlap with public policy incentives.
Prosecutors who believe that collateral consequences promote crime likely also
believe that the collateral consequence amounts to bad public policy. They can
use their control over the plea bargaining process to disrupt public policy
outcomes with which they disagree.134 Debbie, the prosecutor who notes that
prosecutors “don’t want to see people losing their jobs, especially not in today’s
economy,”135 could be seen as taking a public policy position—access to jobs is
desirable for the economy—and also taking the position that the penalty is
disproportionate.
Public policy motives can also be distinct from other considerations. The
prosecutor’s control over the criminal justice process allows for enforcement
decisions that align with the prosecutor’s public policy preferences, even if they
are not linked to any particular law enforcement rationale.
B. COLLATERAL ENFORCEMENT MODEL
The collateral enforcement approach is the mirror image of the mitigation
model. In this model, prosecutors regard the noncriminal consequence as a
desirable end. Prosecutors structure pleas to maximize the likelihood of deporta-
tion, eviction, or loss of a professional license. Prosecutors may also take other
measures to trigger a collateral consequence, such as contacting civil law
enforcement authorities and working to initiate civil administrative enforcement
114th Cong. 84 (2015) (statement of Tom Manger, Chief of Police, President of the Major Cities Chiefs
Association); see also Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and Representa-
tive of Good Policing and Good Public Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247, 252, 254–55 (2012) (citing
examples of policing initiatives designed to reduce the likelihood of deportation); Juliet P. Stumpf,
D(e)volving Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times of Secure Communities, 64 AM. U. L. REV.
1259, 1272–73 nn.47–48 (2015) (describing local law enforcement resistance to the now-defunct
federal immigration initiative Secure Communities).
132. Charles J. Hynes, ComALERT: A Prosecutor’s Collaborative Model for Ensuring a Successful
Transition from Prison to Community, 1 J. CT. INNOVATION 123, 125 (2008).
133. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AMERICA’S FAILURE TO FORGIVE OR
FORGET IN THE WAR ON CRIME 25 (2014), http://www.nacdl.org/restoration/roadmapreport/ [http://perma.
cc/PK7X-PAXS].
134. See Hing, supra note 131, at 303–04 (discussing policing practices designed to reduce the
likelihood of deportation as constituting both good public policy and good policing).
135. Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice, supra note 35, at 373.
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proceedings after an arrest. In taking the collateral enforcement approach,
prosecutors might seek out information about the defendant’s public benefits or
immigration status, and they might leverage the plea bargaining process to
induce defendants to waive protections that are intended to apply in civil
administrative proceedings.136
The enforcement approach has received relatively little attention in the
academic literature on collateral mitigation. But prominent examples exist.
Maricopa County prosecutors in Arizona, for instance, adopt a “no-amnesty”
approach to immigration enforcement. Police officers pull immigration status
information at the time of arrest and prosecutors then choose among potential
charges with the objective of increasing the likelihood of obtaining convictions
that carry immigration consequences.137 Public housing evictions provide an-
other example. Some police and prosecutors focus on combatting crime in
public housing complexes.138 New York City takes the additional step of
allowing prosecutors to facilitate—and in some cases initiate—housing evic-
tions.139 If a landlord elects not to initiate eviction proceedings, the Narcotics
Eviction Program permits prosecutors to pursue evictions directly.140 The goal
is to provide for speedy evictions and convictions.
Some prosecutors regard collateral enforcement as falling within their core
law enforcement duties. Collateral consequences can deter future criminal
activity. The most clear examples are cases where the collateral consequence is
closely related to the criminal act, such as restrictions on firearm ownership
after a gun-related crime141 or bans on holding public office after the defendant
136. In the immigration context, for instance, federal prosecutors may offer plea deals that require
defendants to stipulate to removal. See Julia Preston, 270 Immigrants Sent to Prison in Federal Push,
N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/24/US/24immig.html [http://perma.cc/8Z
A7-KP2H] (discussing a 2008 prosecution of close to 300 factory workers in Postville, Iowa, where
federal prosecutors threatened to bring more serious charges unless the defendants stipulated to their
removability); see also Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1303–04
(2010) (discussing how the Postville defendants who stipulated to removal abandoned their ability to
take advantage of various immigration law measures that may have provided relief from removal).
137. Eagly, supra note 107, at 1187–88.
138. See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 127 (2002) (discussing the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which responded to drug dealers who “increasingly impos[ed] a reign of
terror on public and other federally assisted low-income housing tenants”).
139. See, e.g., Escalera v. N.Y. Hous. Auth., 924 F. Supp. 1323, 1331 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing
how the “Bawdy House” laws have been used by the Narcotics Eviction Program to lead to speedy
evictions).
140. For a discussion of the Narcotics Eviction Program, see Jeffrey Fagan et al., The Paradox of the
Drug Elimination Program in New York City Public Housing, 13 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 415, 425
(2006) (describing the NYPD’s Anti-Narcotics Strike Force as receiving funding to “support special
prosecution activities primarily to evict tenants with drug arrests”); Scott Duffield Levy, The Collateral
Consequences of Seeking Order Through Disorder: New York’s Narcotics Eviction Program, 43 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 539, 545–47 (2008).
141. See Uggen & Stewart, supra note 55, at 1872 (describing merited restrictions as including those
“tailored to particular offenses or individuals”).
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has abused a position of power.142 But collateral consequences also open the
door to enforcement actions that have, at best, an attenuated relationship to
crime control.
Consider New York City’s Narcotics Eviction Program. The program is part
of a broader effort by police and prosecutors to target crime in large public
housing complexes. Police officers provide dedicated patrol services to public
housing authorities,143 and they have the authority to arrest anyone with certain
prior felony drug arrests if they enter public housing or adjacent property.144
The goal may be to focus on the most dangerous tenants. But prosecutors who
process such arrests might come to regard their agenda as encompassing the
broader goal of keeping people with criminal records—or those whom they
view as likely to engage in criminal activity—out of public housing.
Community policing rationales might favor collateral enforcement.145 The
New York County District Attorney’s Office points squarely to such rationales
in explaining its approach to evictions. Prosecutors encourage community
members to anonymously report criminal activity, and they respond to com-
plaints by making arrests and by arranging for police officers to serve as
142. Prosecutors not uncommonly include resignation from public office in the terms of the plea
itself. See, e.g., Kim Chandler, Alabama Rep. Greg Wren Pleads Guilty to Ethics Violation, Resigns,
TUSCALOOSA NEWS (Apr. 1, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20140401/NEWS/
140409988 [http://perma.cc/A7GD-87B7] (immediate resignation from public office as condition of
plea agreement); Richard Fausset, Harrell, South Carolina House Speaker, Pleads Guilty, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/us/south-carolina-bobby-harrell-campaign-finance.
html [http://perma.cc/C4PG-DHKD] (public official agrees to immediately resign and not to run for
public office for a period of three years).
143. In 2013, the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA)—the country’s largest housing
authority—paid the NYPD approximately $70 million for a dedicated police force to patrol its large
complexes. Mireya Navarro & Joseph Goldstein, Policing the Projects of New York City, at a Hefty
Price, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/27/nyregion/policing-the-projects-
of-new-york-city-at-a-hefty-price.html [http://perma.cc/X8WQ-2LLW].
144. N.Y.C. HOUS. AUTH., TRESPASS POLICY FOR FELONY DRUG ARRESTS § III (2005), http://www1.nyc.
gov/html/nycha/downloads/pdf/trespass_policy.pdf [http://perma.cc/97L9-XB6B]. There are exemp-
tions, such as for residents or for those whose arrests have ultimately been dismissed. It is the arrested
individual’s burden to show she fits into an exemption. But in practice, individuals may not know about
the exemptions or may lack the practical ability to challenge an exclusion. See Manny Fernandez,
Barred from Public Housing, Even to See Family, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/10/01/nyregion/01banned.html [http://perma.cc/47X6-584N] (discussing a newsletter that prints
the names of barred individuals—the “Not Wanted List”—and describing families who were unaware
of the appeal procedure).
145. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A
Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 208 (stressing the importance of enabling
“minority communities [to] us[e] their new political power to take charge of the crime problems that
plague their neighborhoods”). For debate about the merits of this approach in the context of a whether
community members should be able to cede their rights to be free from unlawful searches in the interest
of crime control, see Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Forum: When Rights Are Wrong, BOS. REV.,
Apr. 1, 1999, http://bostonreview.net/forum/tracey-l-meares-dan-m-kahan-when-rights-are-wrong [http://
perma.cc/X8XF-9MGV].
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witnesses in eviction proceedings where necessary.146 The District Attorney’s
Office presents this approach as responsive to the concerns of residents, land-
lords, and block associations who are victimized by crime.147
Prosecutors also have incentives to take the enforcement approach when it
promotes valuable relationships with civil law enforcement partners, particu-
larly through the use of additional street-level enforcement agents. Prosecutors
routinely communicate with and share enforcement personnel with actors whose
formal role is civil but who operate to supplement criminal law enforcement
efforts. In the immigration context, for instance, criminal prosecutors can work
closely with immigration enforcement officials to identify “criminal aliens”—
deportable noncitizens who also have a criminal record.148 Criminal prosecutors
have incentives to develop strong relationships with the civil enforcement actors
they view as allies.149 Alliances between criminal and immigration enforcement
officials give prosecutors access to more enforcement personnel. Immigration
enforcement officials also can assist prosecutors by sharing evidence gathered
in immigration-related interviews in immigration raids.150 Prosecutors who
structure pleas to maximize the likelihood of deportation or eviction might
further cement these relationships and maintain prospects for future cooperation
and information sharing.
Relatedly, prosecutors who enforce collateral consequences may gain the
opportunity to take advantage of additional forums for discovery, particularly
where the civil proceeding goes forward before the criminal case. Defendants
who are arrested might face eviction, administrative termination, or license
revocation proceedings while the criminal case is pending.151 Testimony gener-
ated in these types of proceedings, such as about the circumstances underlying
an arrest, may provide relevant evidence in the criminal case.152
Collateral enforcement can also assist prosecutors in disposing of cases more
efficiently. Prosecutors who appropriate the threat of collateral consequences as
leverage in negotiations have more bargaining power overall. Scholars and
146. See N.Y. CTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, TRESPASS AFFIDAVIT AND NARCOTICS EVICTION PROGRAMS
(2010), http://manhattanda.org/sites/default/files/Trespass_Affidavit_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/GY8A-5M
AN].
147. See id.
148. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chaco´n, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the
“Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 320 (criticizing vague standards and
overbroad definitions of “criminal aliens” in the context of gang membership); Eagly, supra note 107,
at 1139–43 (discussing various categories of noncitizens who could be classified “criminal aliens”).
149. See Chaco´n, supra note 148, at 320 (describing cooperation between criminal law enforcement
officials and immigration enforcement officials that is aimed both prosecuting and removing suspected
noncitizen gang members); Eagly, supra note 136 (focusing on federal cooperation between immigra-
tion enforcement officials and criminal prosecutors).
150. See, e.g., Eagly, supra note 136, at 1308–17.
151. See Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word, supra note 7, at 481.
152. For an explanation of how prosecutors might gather evidence in eviction cases that are brought
by landlords under the Narcotics Eviction Program, see id. at 496.
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courts have documented how prosecutors leverage broad criminal laws, jail time
pending trial, and the threat of enhanced criminal charges to secure plea
agreements and persuade defendants to waive procedural protections.153 Collat-
eral consequences are no different. A prosecutor might threaten to pursue
charges that carry collateral consequences just as the prosecutor might stack
criminal charges (including disproportionate ones) to secure the plea.154 A
defendant who places a premium on avoiding deportation will be well-advised
to accept an immigration-safe plea if the alternative conviction risks deporta-
tion. This approach presents the same fairness problems as leveraging dispropor-
tionate criminal penalties to obtain a plea, but it is even harder to monitor
given that the formal criminal penalty itself may well be appropriate.155
Prosecutors might view collateral consequences as a more administratively
efficient substitute for serious criminal sanctions. A prosecutor deciding to
pursue a serious conviction may need to invest more resources in investigation
and trial preparation. Civil penalties that attach to low-level offenses, on the
other hand, impose no additional administrative burdens. This approach can
also save costs for corrections as a whole. Prosecutors who take this approach
may find that it allows them to take more cases overall and also avoids costs
associated with incarceration.
Collateral enforcement allows prosecutors to do an end-run around the
safeguards of criminal procedure. If the prosecutor believes the defendant
deserves a steeper punishment but lacks the evidence or the resources to
investigate and prove the more serious criminal charges, the prosecutor may
appropriate the collateral consequence for retributive reasons. Prosecutors can
enforce collateral consequences where they lack the evidence, the administra-
tive capacity, or merely the inclination to pursue more serious criminal charges.
They can seek collateral consequences if they want to achieve a greater level of
punishment than is available under the criminal law. Prosecutors who view
immigration enforcement as too lax can also enforce collateral consequences to
achieve their preferred public policy outcomes. Prosecutors act within the scope
of their legal discretion in enforcing collateral consequences for any of these
reasons, as long as there is sufficient legal basis for the criminal conviction.
153. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 210 (1995) (permitting defendant to waive
immunity provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence in exchange for a plea); Barkow, supra note 18, at
879 (discussing legal doctrine that permits prosecutors to threaten more serious charges if the defendant
exercises her right to trial); David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729,
1744 (1993) (“Prosecutors can multiply charges or overcharge defendants in order to generate tradable
items.”); Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1064 (2013); Wesley
MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Common Law of Plea Bargaining, 102 KY. L.J. 1, 48 (2013–2014).
154. See DAVIS, supra note 18, at 19–41 (discussing prosecutorial discretion in the charging and plea
bargaining process); Lynch, supra note 18, at 40.
155. See United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 419–20 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
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C. COUNTERBALANCE MODEL
Collateral consequences create incentives for prosecutors to substitute crimi-
nal and civil sanctions to find the appropriate penalty.156 Prosecutors seek a
higher criminal penalty in exchange for avoiding a collateral consequence. The
price of an immigration-safe deal might be “pleading up” to a more serious
crime or serving a longer criminal sentence that does not trigger deportation.157
Prosecutors might take this approach because they want to treat like defen-
dants alike.158 When prosecutors mitigate, they may give some defendants less
punishment than other similarly culpable defendants based solely on the collat-
eral consequence. This creates the potential for bias, both perceived and actual.
The concern is that prosecutors will exercise discretion based on their own
personal sympathies, rather than based on considerations about culpability.
Stiffer criminal penalties in exchange for a better collateral outcome can offset
the perception of favoritism. Prosecutors may also take this approach when they
believe some punishment is justified but there are no equivalent charges that
avoid the collateral penalty. Thus, prosecutors seek a higher penalty—one that
may even impose more punishment than the prosecutor believes is necessary—
as the price of avoiding the collateral consequence.
Counterbalancing also provides a quick way of authenticating collateral
penalties. During the plea bargaining process, prosecutors should seek to verify
information presented by the defendant.159 But authentication takes time, particu-
larly when the relevant information falls well outside the prosecutor’s area of
expertise. The threat of a steeper criminal law penalty can serve as a rough
proxy for verification. The Santa Clara District Attorney’s Office endorses this
approach, on a case by case basis, along with the collateral mitigation approach.
In a manual that notes the practical difficulties in verifying whether a collateral
156. This dynamic occurs outside the context of plea bargaining as well. For instance, some states
allow noncitizen defendants to shorten prison sentences by agreeing to deportation. Eagly, supra note
107, at 1190 (discussing Maricopa’s law allowing convicted noncitizen defendants to shorten prison
sentences by half if they agree to deportation as part of a broader strategy to maximize removals).
157. See, e.g., Lopez v. Jenkins, No. 08cv0457, 2009 WL 4895274, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2009)
(“These bargains are called ‘upward pleas’ because they are pleas to more serious offenses that carry
lengthier custodial sentences; the upside is the reduction or elimination of collateral consequences, such
as the loss of one’s asylum status.”); People v. Bautista, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 862, 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(discussing expert testimony that offering to “plead up” to a higher charge is a standard way to attempt
to avoid certain immigration penalties); Josh Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1133, 1136–37 (2013) (describing a former client who successfully offered to plead guilty to a
misdemeanor rather than a less serious noncriminal “violation” to avoid immigration penalties); Jenny
Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693, 697 (2011) (“[T]he bargained-for sentence
might actually be longer in exchange for a charge bargain that allows the defendant to avoid imposition
of the collateral consequence.”).
158. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987) (discussing the “the principle of treating
similarly situated defendants the same”); David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619,
1620 (2010) (discussing the view that “[w]e punish more serious crimes more severely and aim to
inflict the same punishment on similarly situated offenders who commit similar crimes”).
159. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1971 (1992)
(“[Prosecutors] seek not to verify ‘innocence’ but to verify information.”).
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consequence is genuine, it urges prosecutors to structure pleas to include
“additional custody time to compensate for any shift in charge.”160 This practice
is designed to make it “very unlikely that anyone would accept the offer unless
they were actually facing the claimed collateral consequence.”161
Prosecutors might also take this approach to discourage gamesmanship and to
manage relationships with defense counsel. Some defense attorneys are part of a
close-knit bar and share advocacy strategies.162 Repeat players are likely to ask
for a better deal if it has been offered in the past.163 Prosecutors who mitigate
run the risk of setting a soft “precedent”; defense attorneys could routinely ask
prosecutors to pursue less severe sanctions or drop them altogether regardless of
whether the defendant actually faces the collateral consequence.164 Ronald F.
Wright and Kay L. Levine found in a recent interview-based study that newer
prosecutors reported concern with developing their reputation and not “being
intimidated, outmaneuvered, ‘eat[en]’ or ‘run over’” by more experienced
defense attorneys.165 This, in turn, leads to their taking more rigid, tougher
negotiating positions than more experienced prosecutors. Similarly, the counter-
balance approach can function as a way to offset prosecutorial anxieties about
being taken advantage of in the negotiation process.
D. REFINEMENTS
Before turning to the implications of these approaches, a few clarifications
are in order. First, it is my hope that this framework will be of use in shaping
further empirical work about the process of plea bargaining in light of collateral
consequences. At this point, other than to demonstrate support for each of these
models in practice, I make no claims about how often these approaches occur
relative to each other. Rather, I seek to emphasize that the considerations that
matter to prosecutors are different—and far more complex—than has thus far
been appreciated.
Second, parties who are involved in the negotiation may have difficulty
gauging the actual motivations at issue. Parties may not be transparent in their
stated approach. A prosecutor might have strategic reasons for stating that she is
willing to agree to a deal because she recognizes that a collateral penalty is
disproportionate when, in fact, she simply seeks to dispose of the case quickly.
Prosecutors might also not recognize their own practices. A prosecutor might
believe she takes a mitigation approach when considering the issue in the
160. Memorandum from Jeff Rosen, Dist. Attorney, to Fellow Prosecutors, supra note 94, at 5.
161. Id.
162. Oliver, supra note 153, at 14–15 (describing criminal defense practices as nonhierarchical and
focused on mentorship and information sharing).
163. Bibas, supra note 22, at 2534 (discussing the advantages of defense counsel who are “repeat
players”).
164. See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 24–33, 156–57 (1978).
165. Wright & Levine, supra note 18, at 1092 (alteration in original); see also Easterbrook, supra
note 159, at 1971 (“Members of the criminal defense bar are in constant contact with local prosecutors.
Reputations are valuable in markets characterized by repeat dealing.”).
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abstract but take a different approach in practice.166
Third, prosecutors take different approaches depending on the type of collat-
eral consequence. The same prosecutors who take an enforcement approach to
public housing evictions, for instance, might be willing to mitigate criminal
penalties that trigger immigration consequences. Prosecutors might see enforce-
ment of evictions as a way to reduce crime in large public housing complexes,
but they might see mitigating the likelihood of deportation as the best way to
build trust and cooperation with immigrant communities. Prosecutors might
also take different approaches depending on their relationships with various
civil law agencies or on their internal office structure.167 Prosecutors might also
be willing to take a mitigation approach if there is an equivalent criminal charge
they can pursue that does not trigger the collateral consequence, but they might
take the counterbalance approach if there is no reasonably available lateral
move.
These models are analytically useful in demonstrating the range of potential
approaches to collateral consequences. Pulling apart prosecutorial motivations
is necessary to analyze the work that collateral consequences might be doing
within the plea bargaining system. The next Part turns to the implications of
these dynamics.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Collateral consequences extend prosecutors’ largely unreviewable discretion
to an array of legal consequences, regulatory policies, and public interests. As
the Padilla majority noted, this dynamic can serve the mutual interests of the
parties. Prosecutors can structure pleas to achieve outcomes they believe are
fair, proportionate, and that serve law-enforcement ends while also allowing
defendants the opportunity to secure sanctions at the lowest cost to themselves.
After an arrest, plea bargaining might also be a defendant’s only opportunity to
avoid an otherwise mandatory collateral penalty.168
But this discretion comes with a cost. Prosecutors necessarily gain the ability
to selectively and inconsistently appropriate collateral consequences as a source
of leverage or for retributive ends. Prosecutorial decision making in light of
collateral consequences can compromise law enforcement legitimacy, and it can
also disrupt the goals of civil regulators. This Part discusses the implications of
prosecuting collateral consequences along these dimensions.
166. See Altman, supra note 107, at 28–31 (noting that of the 185 prosecutors who completed a
survey distributed in Kings County, Brooklyn, slightly more than 53% reported that they would
mitigate in the abstract, but 46% reported doing so in practice).
167. For a recent discussion of how internal office organization may affect prosecutorial behavior,
see Levine & Wright, supra note 115.
168. See Lee, supra note 69, at 556 (noting that plea bargaining may be the best opportunity for a
noncitizen defendant to avoid removal).
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A. SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
Thus far, commentators have tended to focus on whether prosecutors miti-
gate.169 But an equally important question is why prosecutors mitigate. The
desire to offset an unjustified harm is distinct from the desire for administrative
efficiency, even if the outcomes are the same. The former approach reflects a
judgment about how to balance law enforcement goals with achieving propor-
tional outcomes. When the only available conviction will trigger disproportion-
ate state-imposed harm—regardless of whether it is civil or criminal—
prosecutors make the principled decision to pursue different charges or drop the
charges altogether. They may take this approach even if they determine that
some level of criminal punishment is justified.
By contrast, prosecutors who mitigate because it is administratively efficient
make judgments that reflect their own personal commitments and institutional
capacity. Pleas reflect workloads, rather than abstract concerns about culpabil-
ity. This occurs in the context of criminal sentences as well, of course. But when
collateral consequences come into play, the stakes of this decision can reach
well beyond the relatively minor criminal penalty that is formally at issue.
Major civil outcomes such as deportation can turn on whether the prosecutor
has the time to pursue a relatively minor criminal offense. Prosecutors who
focus on efficiency rationales also make no principled commitments in terms of
how they respond to civil penalties. They may be just as likely to selectively
enforce collateral consequences, such as by using the threat of a collateral
consequence as leverage to secure a collateral-safe plea, as they are to drop
charges if the defendant insists on going to trial.
Prosecutors who leverage the threat of a collateral consequence to secure a
plea are similar to those who threaten steeper criminal penalties if defendants
exercise their right to trial or those who deliberately draw out the misdemeanor
process as a source of leverage.170 But enforcement of collateral consequences
represents an even less visible exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The impact
of prosecutorial discretion cannot be measured by looking at charging decisions,
dispositions, or sentence lengths alone.
Prosecutors who enforce collateral consequences may also gain the capacity
to pursue marginal cases that they would otherwise dismiss. As Darryl Brown
notes, as a general matter, prosecutors who have the ability to substitute less
costly procedures for more expensive ones can bring the criminal process to
bear on a larger population.171 A system of plea bargaining thus allows prosecu-
tors to pursue more cases than a system of trials.172 Collateral consequences
triggered by low-level convictions that substitute for what would otherwise be
169. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text (discussing the process costs imposed by
lengthy delays in misdemeanor courts).
171. Brown, supra note 26, at 186.
172. See id.
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more serious criminal convictions build the criminal justice system’s capacity.
This, in turn, may lead to more criminal caseloads overall, reaching well beyond
the point that is considered optimal.173
Selective enforcement of collateral consequences has the potential to expand
the scope of prosecutorial discretion in other ways. Prosecutors do not simply
react to information presented during plea discussions; in some cases, as in the
Maricopa example, prosecutors actively seek out information about the defen-
dant’s immigration status or work status, which then informs how they exercise
discretion. Depending on the context, this dynamic might be justified by clearly
defined law enforcement objectives. It may even lead to more proportionate,
tailored punishments. Whether this actually follows, however, depends on a
number of variables, such as the goals of the prosecutor’s office, the commun-
ity’s support for those goals, and how well the office conveys its goals to the
community. If communities are concerned about drug dealing in public housing
and prosecutors work with communities to learn about and address crime in
public housing, they can make targeted enforcement efforts, selectively seeking
eviction only when it appears that a defendant poses a security risk to neigh-
bors. If they lacked the ability to influence evictions, they might pursue height-
ened criminal sanctions across the board. The concern, however, is that
prosecutors may seek collateral enforcement as a general matter, rather than
investing the time to determine whether the community would be safer as a
result of the eviction. The risk is that prosecutors will take the default approach
of seeking collateral consequences as an additional means of achieving deter-
rence, even when there is no compelling rationale for doing so.
With respect to procedural fairness, commentary has tended to focus on
whether defendants are aware of the collateral consequence at the time of the
guilty plea. But procedural fairness depends on more than access to information
about the collateral consequences. It also depends on defendants’ ability to
make reasoned judgments, access viable alternatives, and seek the advice of
counsel. Defendants may not face a simple choice between going to trial or
accepting a plea. Given the delays associated with obtaining a trial in misde-
meanor courts—and the risk that the open arrest itself may lead to job loss or
other significant penalties—even informed defendants have limited options.
They evaluate the impact of process costs, the possibility of heightened criminal
sanctions if they proceed to trial and lose, and the risk that a quick plea may
carry a more serious collateral consequence. The choice is how best to manage
the impact of a criminal record in a way that causes the least amount of harm.
Collateral consequences can also exacerbate existing information disparities
between defendants and prosecutors. Even setting aside collateral conse-
quences, prosecutors have important pre-plea information advantages over defen-
dants in criminal cases.174 When defense attorneys negotiate collateral
173. Id.
174. DAVIS, supra note 18, at 22–39 (discussing prosecutors’ control over charges and grand juries).
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consequences with prosecutors, they face additional information barriers. Pros-
ecutors can bring to bear a wide range of priorities when they evaluate collateral
consequences. It can be difficult for a defendant to ascertain these priorities and
to know ex ante if the prosecutor considers loss of work an undesirable public
policy outcome or an appropriate and fitting penalty. The relevant consider-
ations extend far beyond the criminal law.
In some cases, collateral consequences create ethical dilemmas for defense
counsel and defendants for which there is no easy answer. Consider an example
raised by the Deputy State Public Defender of Wisconsin, Michael Tobin, who
asks how to respond when a former client asks, “Why didn’t my lawyer tell me
to plead guilty?”175 Tobin notes that in Wisconsin some young defendants are
better off with a conviction rather than a dismissal because the conviction will
be expunged but a dismissal of the same charge will remain on the defendant’s
record and likely serve as a barrier to employment.176 If the defendant cares
most about the “mark” of a criminal record, she would be well-advised to plead
guilty, even if she can persuade the prosecutor to dismiss the case.
This scenario represents an extreme version of the ethical dilemma defense
attorneys face whenever they advise defendants who could likely prevail at trial
that they would be better off pleading guilty. The advice might be sound if the
concern is minimizing the overall harm that flows from an arrest, but it also
reflects a deeper procedural fairness problem. Defendants who care most about
avoiding collateral consequences may accept criminal convictions because they
trigger the fewest known harms,177 not because they reflect culpability or the
strength of the evidence.
Plea bargaining in light of collateral consequences enables prosecutors to
blend civil and criminal penalties in a way that is instrumental rather than
principled. Writing in the “crimmigration” context, David Sklansky uses the
term “ad hoc instrumentalism” to describe “a manner of thinking about law and
legal institutions that downplays concerns about consistency. . . . In any given
situation, faced with any given problem, officials are encouraged to use which-
ever tools are most effective against the person or persons causing the prob-
lem.”178 Sklansky describes this approach as “instrumental” because “whether
175. Michael Tobin, Dismissed Charges Not Always the Best Outcome?, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
RESOURCE CTR. (Nov. 13, 2014), http://ccresourcecenter.org/2014/11/13/dismissed-charges-not-always-
the-best-outcome/ [https://perma.cc/W3CS-4BB2].
176. Id. For purposes of this discussion, I assume that sealing is effective in preventing criminal
records from being accessed by other parties. But as a practical matter, this is not always the case.
Adam Liptak, Expunged Criminal Records Live to Tell Tales, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2006), http://www.
nytimes.com/2006/10/17/us/17expunge.html?pagewantedall [http://perma.cc/EO7A-8944].
177. Even informed defendants who bargain around collateral consequences face significant uncer-
tainty about the long-term consequences of their criminal record. This is particularly true in the
employment context. See DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 34 (2007).
178. David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV.
157, 161 (2012).
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behavior should be treated as criminal, for example, depends on whether
criminal procedures and sanctions will best accomplish the government’s objec-
tives, not on any abstract considerations of fit or appropriateness” and as “ad
hoc” because “whether to invoke criminal procedures and criminal sanctions is
decided case by case, based on whatever circumstances seem most compelling
in that particular instance.”179
This approach creates the risk that prosecutors will selectively enforce collat-
eral consequences when it serves their own broadly defined interests but ignore
them when it does not. The plea bargaining process itself may facilitate this
dynamic. Plea bargaining is a poor vehicle for making principled arguments.
With plea bargains—as with contracts in general—the law regulates the final
outcome, and to some extent the process by which parties reach that outcome,
but not a party’s rationale for seeking the deal. A party has every incentive to
appeal to whatever she believes her adversary’s interests to be rather than make
an argument from principle. Pragmatic arguments—those that emphasize admin-
istrative capacity and efficiency—may be more persuasive than principled
arguments about fairness and proportionality.180
The risk is that, on a systemic level, prosecutors may privilege pragmatic
concerns about case management over other interests. A prosecutor might
choose to pursue sanctions that result in serious harms—deportation, pension
loss, or loss of housing—because these penalties provide a source of leverage or
because they are easily available rather than because they are justified and
proportionate.
Selective enforcement of collateral consequences also runs the risk of exacer-
bating underlying biases in the criminal justice system. As a general matter,
discretionary and nontransparent interactions are rife with potential for discrimi-
nation. Race discrimination has been documented in contexts such as buying a
retail car,181 seeking to buy or rent a home,182 and applying for a job,183 as well
as in a range of discretionary decisions that are made in the criminal justice
system.184 Plea negotiations are no exception.185
179. Id.
180. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Padilla could arguably be said to reflect this approach as well.
It cited an administrative efficiency rationale as the only reason for why a prosecutor might mitigate a
collateral consequence—“the threat of deportation may provide the defendant with a powerful incentive
to plead guilty to an offense that does not mandate that penalty in exchange for a dismissal of a charge
that does”—even though the opinion as a whole also expressed concerns about deportation functioning
as a disproportionate penalty. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010).
181. See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104
HARV. L. REV. 817, 819 (1991).
182. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES 2012 (2013), http://www.huduser.org/portal/Publications/pdf/
HUD-514_HDS2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/7U7J-7VRC].
183. See, e.g., Devah Pager et al., Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field Experi-
ment, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 777–79 (2009) (finding systemic discrimination in hiring because of race).
184. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 57; Davis, supra note 57, at 16 (stating that African-
Americans are discriminated against throughout the criminal justice process as compared to whites);
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One recent study found that federal prosecutors are nearly twice as likely to
charge African-American men with crimes that triggered mandatory minimums
than they are to charge whites with those crimes.186 Data from state prosecu-
tors’ offices reflect a similar bias. In a rare move, the District Attorney of New
York—one of the largest prosecutor’s offices in the country—voluntarily opened
two years’ worth of files to outside scrutiny for racial discrimination.187 After
analyzing the files from 2012 to 2014, a study conducted by the Vera Institute
for Justice found systemic racial discrimination in plea outcomes.188 Black
defendants in misdemeanor drug cases were almost thirty percent more likely
than similarly situated whites to receive a custodial sentence (one that included
jail or prison time) instead of a sentence that included noncustodial offers such
as community service or probation.189
Prosecutors, of course, are not alone in exhibiting bias. Defense attorneys
likewise exhibit bias in triaging cases, offering counsel, and in the rigorousness
of their advocacy.190 The combined effects of biased decision making can be
devastating for African-Americans, who are not only disproportionately likely
to be arrested, but also disproportionately experience collateral consequences
because of a criminal record.191
B. UNDERMINING LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGITIMACY
Collateral consequences impact communities, not just the parties to the plea.
Community policing and prosecution strategies are premised on the idea that
community participation and deliberation matter.192 In theory, police and prosecu-
tors respond to the concerns of communities, which in turn evaluate and
respond to how law enforcement officials pursue their goals. Transparency and
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communi-
ties, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272–73 (2004) (discussing mass incarceration of African-American men).
185. See Barkow, supra note 18, at 883 (“The consolidation of adjudicative and enforcement power
in a single prosecutor is also troubling because it creates an opportunity for that actor’s prejudices and
biases to dictate outcomes.”).
186. See Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing
the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 7 (2013).
187. BESIKI KUTATELADZE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, RACE AND PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN 1–2
(2014), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/race-and-prosecution-manhattan-
summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/PY5P-62WN].
188. Id. at 3.
189. Id. at 7. These statistics are revealing for another reason: they are not a representative sample. A
study based only on prosecutors who voluntarily open up their files for scrutiny is subject to selection
bias; those who chose not to share their files may well display more bias.
190. See generally L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public
Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626 (2013) (discussing how implicit racial bias can adversely affect
African-American defendants).
191. African-Americans, for instance, are disproportionately likely to be denied work because of a
criminal record. Pager et al., supra note 183, at 777–80; Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record,
108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 957–60 (2003).
192. David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1797 (2005) (noting that
both critics and proponents of order-maintenance policing tactics emphasize the importance of “partici-
pation and deliberation”).
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effective communication are essential to this approach; communities need to
understand how law enforcement agencies define and implement their goals.
Collateral consequences erect barriers to achieving transparency. They prevent
communities from understanding the work that prosecutors are doing.
To be clear, even in the context of criminal law, prosecutorial decision
making is opaque. Plea bargaining takes place in a black box: dispositions are
publicly reported, but not the process of reaching those dispositions. Collateral
consequences further obscure the impact of prosecutorial decision making.
Statistics that track outcomes in the criminal justice system—sentence lengths,
rates of conviction, and type of conviction—provide important data regarding
how prosecutors exercise discretion and define their goals. But these statistics
do not reflect how prosecutors influence collateral consequences. Communities
thus lose an important window into law enforcement decision making. This, in
turn, undermines the ability of communities to understand how law enforcement
agencies implement their enforcement agendas and to decide whether that
enforcement authority is justified.193
Consider the example of misdemeanor marijuana arrests. In recent years, in
response to local sentiment, some law enforcement agencies have re-evaluated
their approach to prosecuting minor marijuana possession.194 In New York, for
instance, after the Brooklyn District Attorney announced a policy of no longer
prosecuting marijuana misdemeanors, the New York City Police Department
followed suit. In late 2014, New York City announced that police would issue
tickets instead of conducting arrests for low-level possession.195 New York
City’s annual report demonstrates the impact of this change. In 2009, minor
marijuana possession was the top charge in New York City; prosecutors filed
over 40,000 petty misdemeanor possession charges. In 2014, the year the new
policy was announced, that number dropped by half.196 Law enforcement
officials who supported the reform cited its potential to improve outcomes,
particularly for minority community members who had been subject to dispropor-
tionate arrests.197 This type of outcome—a law enforcement agency changing
193. Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police
Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 235 (2008) (discussing the benefits of
building law enforcement legitimacy).
194. Joseph Goldstein, Marijuana May Mean Ticket, Not Arrest, in New York City, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/10/nyregion/in-shift-police-dept-to-stop-low-level-marijuana-
arrests-officials-say.html [http://perma.cc/GW8W-966M].
195. This approach reflects a change in enforcement practices, but not a change in the law itself;
marijuana possession remains a crime. For a discussion of distinct approaches that can fall within the
rubric of “decriminalization,” see Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L.
REV. 1055 (2015).
196. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CLERK OF N.Y.C. CRIMINAL COURT, CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK: ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at 31 (2015), https://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/nyc/criminal/cc_annl_rpt_
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/22E8-TX8P]. This is the most recent report currently available.
197. See Press Release, City of New York, Office of the Mayor, Reactions to Mayor de Blasio,
Commissioner Bratton’s Announcement of Policy Change to Reduce Marijuana Possession Arrests
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its practices in response to the needs of local communities—is the type of
dynamic that community policing seeks to promote.
With collateral consequences, communities who want to understand the reach
of prosecutorial discretion cannot rely on signifiers such as conviction rates or
sentence lengths. A collateral consequence could follow from a conviction
because the prosecutor was unaware of it and had no intentional role in shaping
it. In other cases, the prosecutor may have deliberately structured a plea to
create a collateral outcome. And in still other cases, the prosecutor may have
made a significant but unsuccessful effort to mitigate a collateral consequence.
Unless prosecutors make affirmative efforts to articulate how they approach
collateral consequences, communities have little ability to ascertain how prosecu-
torial discretion relates to collateral consequences. This, in turn, can undermine
efforts by law enforcement to reach out to communities and build better
relationships.
C. DISRUPTING CIVIL REGULATORS
State and local prosecutors balance many competing interests. Fidelity to the
goals of civil regulators is generally not among them. To be sure, prosecutors
may choose to align their efforts with civil regulatory agencies when they have
overlapping interests or when they receive funding or other forms of support.
But absent these considerations, prosecutors who make de facto decisions about
collateral consequences do not apply the same criteria as civil regulatory actors.
This dynamic can disrupt civil enforcement priorities. It also extends the impact
of prosecutorial decision making to factors that lie outside prosecutors’ institu-
tional competence.
There are two different ways prosecutorial discretion can affect collateral
consequences. The impact of prosecutorial discretion is most pronounced when
collateral consequences are mandatory or largely automatic. With mandatory
collateral consequences, lawmakers have chosen to strip discretion from civil
regulators. After a conviction, the civil penalty necessarily follows. For in-
stance, in 1996, federal lawmakers expanded the categories of conviction that
triggered mandatory deportation for lawful permanent residents.198 Previously,
immigration enforcement officials had broader discretion not to engage in
removal after the conviction.199 In taking this approach, lawmakers may have
intended to strip discretion altogether; they may have intended that every
immigrant convicted of a particular crime be deported. But, because criminal
charges are redundant and some charges carry immigration consequences whereas
(Nov. 10, 2014), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/509-14/reactions-mayor-de-blasio-
commissioner-bratton-s-announcement-policy-change-reduce [https://perma.cc/S84A-S2UP].
198. See Morawetz, supra note 68, at 1936 (describing the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act as having “drasti-
cally changed the consequences of criminal convictions for lawful permanent residents” by making
deportation mandatory, rather than discretionary, in “large classes of cases”).
199. Id. at 1938–39.
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others do not, criminal prosecutors continued to exercise discretion over immi-
gration removal decisions. Immigration officials, however, did not. Thus, in
practice, mandatory collateral consequences strip administrative discretion from
civil regulators, but not from criminal prosecutors.
By contrast, with discretionary consequences, civil regulatory actors retain
the ability to exercise discretion after a conviction. Prosecutors exercise discre-
tion through the charging and plea bargaining process. Civil regulators then
exercise formal discretion by determining whether to proceed with a civil
penalty.
Prosecutors who enforce collateral consequences bring to bear incentives that
are distinct from civil regulators. Writing in the immigration context, Stephen
Lee highlights this dynamic and conceptualizes state prosecutors as “de facto
immigration courts.”200 State prosecutors are not formally tasked with immigra-
tion enforcement authority, but they possess the functional authority to make
decisions about removal.201 However, there is a key difference in how they
exercise discretion vis-à-vis immigration officials. When federal immigration
officials exercise discretion, they are subject to publicly available guidance.202
These guidelines reflect the agency’s priorities. Criminal prosecutors, on the
other hand, have no obligation to defer to those priorities. Instead, prosecutors
respond to structural incentives, such as the law enforcement needs of the
community, resource constraints, and relationships with the defense bar. As a
functional matter, the prosecutor can thus exercise more power than the govern-
ment officials who have been formally tasked with enforcement power and who
have the institutional competence to make civil regulatory judgments.
This dynamic is perhaps most problematic when the prosecutor is the only
actor who exercises discretion, as with automatic collateral consequences. But
in practice, even with discretionary collateral consequences, prosecutors exer-
cise significant influence. Public housing authorities, for instance, often have
discretion over whether to evict households after one member’s conviction,
including on the basis of factors such as the seriousness of the offense or its
impact on other members of a household.203 But they may not actually exercise
that discretion if they can easily replace one tenant with another from a long
waitlist.
In addition, even when civil regulators ultimately choose not to trigger a
collateral consequence, prosecutors can trigger an immediate enforcement deci-
sion while the civil regulatory proceeding is pending. A noncitizen may spend
months in civil immigration detention after a minor criminal conviction, even if
immigration authorities ultimately make a discretionary judgment not to pro-
200. Lee, supra note 69, at 553.
201. Id. at 556.
202. Id. at 577–78.
203. See, e.g., Letter from Michael M. Liu, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to
Pub. Hous. Dirs. (June 6, 2002), http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/regs/rucker6jun2002.pdf [http://perma.
cc/4WWZ-QD6T] (issuing guidance on factors that ought to guide eviction decisions).
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ceed with deportation.204 With professional licensing, there may be a delay
between the conviction and the civil regulatory decision, during which time the
defendant is subject to an unpaid suspension.205 Thus, civil administrative
discretion at best limits the impact of prosecutorial discretion, but it does not
offset it altogether.
Prosecutorial decision making can also be more opaque than that of civil
regulators. Prosecutors exercise autonomy, discretion, and a unique degree of
“unreviewable power.”206 This is particularly true in petty cases.207 Plea agree-
ments need not even be written down.208 Law enforcement agencies publish
disposition information about the ultimate criminal conviction and sentence.
But disposition information alone does not show whether, how, or why prosecu-
tors influence collateral consequences. By contrast, some civil regulatory agen-
cies publish considerable data about their administrative priorities and
enforcement decisions.209
Relative to policymakers, judges, or other actors, prosecutors might be best
situated to evaluate whether and when enforcement of collateral consequences
reduces crime. They might also have the most institutional competence to
evaluate how collateral consequences affect their administrative capacities. But
they have no particular institutional competence to decide public policy at large.
When prosecutors influence collateral consequences based on their workloads
or their views on public policy, their motivations can play an outsized and
undesirable role in fashioning policy.
Even when prosecutors seek to influence collateral consequences primarily
from the perspective of reducing crime, their enforcement choices run the risk
of undermining other competing interests. As Rachel Barkow put it in a related
context, when decisions about evictions or deportation are made by prosecutors—
“and thus through the lens of what would be good for prosecutors and their
cases and from the limited perspective of those who have prosecuted cases but
have not represented other interests”—there is the risk that the outcome is not
204. See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text.
205. This dynamic can be true of arrests as well. See Jain, supra note 44, at 865 (discussing taxicab
license suspension).
206. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 959, 960 (2009); See Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
323, 331 (2004) (“[P]rosecutors have essentially no formal external checks on their discretion.”);
Stuntz, supra note 19, at 522.
207. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1317 (2012) (“More broadly,
misdemeanor processing reveals the deep structure of the criminal system: as a pyramid that functions
relatively transparently and according to legal principle at the top, but in an opaque and unprincipled
way for the vast majority of cases at the bottom.”).
208. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Con-
sumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1154 (2011).
209. Immigration enforcement authorities, for instance, publish data about their enforcement priori-
ties and the number and type of removals in any given year. See, e.g., U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENF’T, ERO ANNUAL REPORT: FY 2013 ICE IMMIGRATION REMOVALS 2 (2013), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
about/offices/ero/pdf/2013-ice-immigration-removals.pdf [http://perma.cc/FQ4G-KEAP].
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“good policy overall, taking into account interests other than law enforcement.”210
Collateral consequences can also obscure how civil and criminal regulatory
bureaucracies influence each other. Prosecutors and civil regulators each may
depict themselves as operating independently when, in fact, they work together
to shape a shared agenda. Immigration enforcement officials who focus on
“criminal aliens,” for instance, state that removal decisions turn on the severity
of conviction.211 This conveys a separate decision-making process; the criminal
justice system operates first, determines the type of conviction, and the immigra-
tion decision takes place afterward.212 But, on a practical level, civil regulatory
officials may coordinate with prosecutors to shape how convictions unfold in
the first instance. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE) not only estab-
lishes removal priorities based on the type and severity of criminal convictions,
but it also to some extent shapes what types of convictions fall within those
priorities. ICE offers training to state prosecutors designed to influence their
decision making. In one training, for instance, ICE described “10 Ways that
Criminal Aliens Avoid Immigration Consequences for Their Convictions.”213
This training goes beyond the provision of factual information about how
immigration enforcement unfolds; it implicitly acknowledges that convictions
are an imperfect proxy for ICE’s goals. Sometimes the proxy is too broad, and,
at other times, it is not broad enough to capture those that ICE seeks to deport.
Immigration enforcement officials are thus aware that state prosecutors who
adjust plea bargains have the ability to frustrate their goals, and they can
respond by reaching out to state prosecutors and advocating for convictions that
are more in keeping with ICE’s own regulatory priorities. This may be a
reasonable administrative response. It is nonetheless at odds with immigration
officials’ public position that they apply their discretion to convictions as
opposed to actively shaping how those convictions take place. This type of
interaction also undermines the public’s interest in understanding the true reach
of prosecutorial discretion. The public is aware of ICE’s stated agenda and its
own enforcement decisions, but not how ICE shapes the behavior of formally
independent state prosecutors.
CONCLUSION
Advocates and policymakers have recently made welcome efforts to lower
the barriers to understanding collateral consequences. But in itself, informed
210. Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of
Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 274 (2013).
211. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2015 1 (2015), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/fy2015removal
Stats.pdf [https://perma.cc/L722-9NCA] (discussing federal immigration removal priorities and show-
ing how many removals fell within those priorities).
212. See Eagly, supra note 136 (describing and criticizing the view that immigration enforcement
and criminal prosecution proceed on separate tracks).
213. Eagly, supra note 107, at 1221–22.
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consideration of collateral consequences will not necessarily lead to better
outcomes. On a functional level, informed consideration of collateral conse-
quences shifts enforcement discretion to the prosecutors who play a crucial role
in plea outcomes. Much depends on how prosecutors exercise their discretion.
To robustly engage with the question of what ought to be done, there is a
need for more empirical information about how prosecutors respond to collat-
eral consequences during the plea bargaining process. As policymakers develop
resources designed to facilitate informed consideration of collateral conse-
quences, it is important to understand how both prosecutors and defense attor-
neys make use of these resources going forward.
I conclude by outlining possible directions for future work. My goal is to
illuminate relevant questions, suggest directions for reforms, and illustrate the
potential tradeoffs of certain approaches. I consider potential avenues for reform
along the following general dimensions: promoting informed plea bargaining,
transferring some enforcement discretion to actors other than prosecutors, and
guiding the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
First, prosecutors as well as defendants and defense attorneys need to be
aware of collateral consequences during the plea bargaining process. Prosecu-
tors who are unaware of collateral consequences can unintentionally trigger
civil consequences. This can impose more harm than they believe is justified,
and it can work against the state’s broader interests in reducing crime and
building community relationships.
In Padilla, the U.S. Supreme Court took an important first step in recognizing
how awareness of immigration consequences could change the behavior of both
prosecutors and defendants. There are compelling reasons to apply the Padilla
rationale outside the immigration context. Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court declined to extend Padilla to the case of pension loss, reasoning that loss
of money was not equivalent to deportation.214 But as some Justices recognized
during the Padilla oral argument, it is hard to draw a principled distinction
between deportation and other collateral consequences, such as lifelong civil
confinement.215 Depending on their circumstances, reasonable people might
differ about which penalty they find the most severe.
A different, more normatively defensible rule would require defense counsel
to inform defendants of any collateral consequence that might well have a
significant impact on a reasonable defendant.216 This is an objective test; it does
214. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
215. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (No. 08-651)
(“Which, if any of the following, would you not put in the same category as advice about immigration
consequences: Advice about consequences for a conviction for a sex offense, the loss of professional
licensing or future employment opportunities, civil liability, tax liability, right to vote, right to bear
arms.”).
216. Jenny Roberts has advocated for this reform in detail. See Roberts, supra note 71, at 674,
713–35 (advocating for a duty of defense counsel to warn “whenever a reasonable person in the
defendant’s situation would deem knowledge of the consequence, penal or otherwise, to be a significant
factor in deciding whether to plead guilty”).
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not turn on the type of offense or the defendant’s particular reactions to it.
In assessing the merits of this approach, one set of questions relates to
constraints on providing information about collateral consequences. Current
levels of indigent defense funding are nowhere near sufficient to provide for
meaningful advice. Public defenders face chronic funding deficits, in the most
egregious cases representing upward of 2,000 clients per year.217 A serious
commitment to providing advice about collateral consequences would require
either a dramatic reduction in the number of collateral consequences or in the
reach of the criminal justice system. Even then, defense attorneys will remain
ill-equipped to address a range of privately imposed collateral consequences,
such as barriers to employment.
One possibility is that a genuine commitment to promoting information about
collateral consequences might indeed “break the back” of the plea bargaining
system.218 This would lead to smaller criminal caseloads overall. But another
possibility is that collateral consequences might be replaced by other penal
techniques that are even less visible and harder to address. Recent scholarship
analyzes this trend in a number of different settings. Alexandra Natapoff makes
the argument, for instance, that the decriminalization of certain misdemeanors
(as opposed to full legalization) carries a “dark side” through the generation of
noncriminal offenses that are easy to impose and that are still punishable by
fines, arrests, and jail time.219 Similar dynamics emerge with the widespread use
of penal techniques such as supervised release or alternative courts. These
measures are often depicted as better alternatives to traditional penal techniques
such as incarceration, but they also allow for indeterminate and significant
forms of punishment with diminished procedural protections.220
Another important issue is which type of institution ought to exercise discre-
tion over collateral consequences. Mandatory or largely automatic collateral
consequences—those that do not permit civil enforcement actors to exercise
enforcement discretion following a conviction—grant prosecutors the most
217. NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 72 (2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/10/139.pdf [http://perma.cc/TSQ3-BZ63]; NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES,
MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 9 (2009), http://www.
nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/misdemeanor/$FILE/Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/D66S-NMQP]; Na-
tapoff, supra note 153, at 1070 (“Most misdemeanor counsel as a practical matter cannot provide a
zealous defense, or sometimes any defense at all, due to underfunding and massive caseloads.”);
Roberts, supra note 27, at 279–80 (discussing indigent defenders who are paid by flat fee and carry
caseloads of over 2,000 clients a year, well above the national recommendations).
218. Brief for States, supra note 86, at 1.
219. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1055,
1058–60 (2015).
220. See Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 958 (2013); Tonja Jacobi et al., The Attrition of Rights Under Parole, 87 S. CAL. L. REV.
887, 889, 891–92 (2014) (arguing that although parole is widely considered a “defendant-friendly”
institution it undermines important Fourth Amendment rights of both defendants and their communi-
ties); Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law,
100 GEO. L.J. 1587 (2012).
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functional control over collateral consequences. Discretionary collateral conse-
quences give prosecutors less formal influence; both the prosecutor and the civil
regulator must make a decision to trigger the collateral consequence.
As a structural matter, mandatory collateral consequences give prosecutors
the most enforcement power. For a number of reasons, this approach is undesir-
able. Prosecutors are not well-suited to making broad judgments about policy.
They decide issues that lie far outside their institutional competence. Prosecu-
tors exercise a unique degree of autonomy and they have a number of compet-
ing incentives. Attempting to balance these interests can lead prosecutors to take
approaches that may undermine broader public policy objectives as well as their
own law enforcement goals.
As a formal matter, discretionary collateral consequences may thus appear to
be a better approach. With discretionary collateral consequences, both civil and
criminal actors have the ability to exercise discretion. In theory, this limits the
impact of prosecutorial discretion. But discretionary collateral consequences
can create their own problems. They can undermine efforts to promote informa-
tion about collateral consequences. Mandatory collateral consequences provide
a level of certainty that discretionary ones do not. Discretionary consequences
are much harder for defense attorneys to predict. This creates the risk that
collateral consequences will still be imposed as frequently as they are under a
mandatory framework, but defendants will have even less information when
considering them during the plea bargaining process. Thus, in evaluating the
merits of mandatory or discretionary collateral consequences, a crucial factor is
whether and when civil regulators actually exercise discretion.221
Another consideration is whether there is a viable way to retain certain
collateral consequences but also channel enforcement discretion away from
prosecutors. Some localities have taken the approach of having an agency,
similar to a parole board, evaluate whether postconviction collateral conse-
quences are justified. For certain types of collateral consequences, this approach
provides a back-end way of disaggregating civil and criminal penalties. A
handful of states adopt this approach through administrative “certificates of
rehabilitation.”222 New York has the most expansive program and allows former
defendants to apply for relief from employment and other collateral conse-
221. Hiroshi Motomura, for instance, has argued that immigration enforcement officials too often
fail to exercise meaningful discretion after an arrest in the context of identifying and removing
unauthorized immigrants. Motomura argues that the “discretion that matters” in the immigration
context is thus the discretion to arrest, not backend civil administrative discretion. HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 129–30 (2014); Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters:
Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil–Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1819, 1858 (2011).
222. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, SECOND CHANCES IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION AND REENTRY STRATEGIES 50 (2007), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cecs/secondchances.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2EDB-LGWS].
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quences.223 The certificate automatically removes statutory barriers to employ-
ment and provides presumptive “proof of rehabilitation.”224 This approach still
allows prosecutors to make a front-end decision about collateral enforcement
because the collateral penalty is linked to the conviction. But the certificate of
rehabilitation—at least for those who are able to go through the additional
process of seeking it—provides a downstream way to remove the collateral
consequence. It provides an avenue for another actor to review the collateral
consequence and determine whether it is appropriate.
Another approach is for legislatures to create judicial oversight of collateral
consequences. Judges could evaluate collateral consequences during sentencing
and exercise discretion to modify the sentence if the court determines that the
collateral sanction is excessive and does not serve the interests of justice.
Legislatures could also allow for “judicial recommendations” against the imposi-
tion of a particular collateral consequence. As the Padilla Court recognized,
immigration law previously allowed for a “judicial recommendation against
deportation,” or a JRAD, whereby judges made binding recommendations
against removal.225 The JRAD represented a “formal” way for judges to operate
“within the interstitial space binding the immigration and the criminal justice
systems.”226 One version of the JRAD also allowed the judge to seek input from
the prosecutor, the defendant, and immigration enforcement officials about
whether a particular immigration outcome is desirable.227 This approach limits
the impact of prosecutorial discretion, but it creates the risk of a greater
administrative burden.
Other reforms could guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. One way
of doing this is through publicly available prosecutorial discretion guidelines.
Former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder took this approach by establishing
guidelines for federal sentencing and charging.228 The guidelines established
what criteria are not permissible in plea bargaining. For instance, the guidelines
stated that “[p]lea agreements should reflect the totality of a defendant’s con-
duct” and prohibited charges from being filed “simply to exert leverage to
223. Id.; see also N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 700–705, 703-a, 703-b (McKinney 2015).
224. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 700–705, 703-a, 703-b (McKinney 2015).
225. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 361–62 (2010). The Court further noted that the “JRAD[]
had the effect of binding the Executive to prevent deportation; the statute was ‘consistently . . . inter-
preted as giving the sentencing judge conclusive authority to decide whether a particular conviction
should be disregarded as a basis for deportation.’” Id. at 362 (quoting Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d
449, 452 (2d Cir. 1986)). For discussions of the benefits of reintroducing the JRAD, see Jason A. Cade,
Essay, Return of the JRAD, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 36 (2015); Lee, supra note 69, at 597–600.
226. Lee, supra note 69, at 598.
227. See id.
228. See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors 1
(May, 19, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/holder-memo-charging-
sentencing.pdf [http://perma.cc/F3EL-HF85] (including instructions that “[c]harging decisions . . . be
informed . . . by the general purposes of criminal law enforcement: punishment, public safety, deter-
rence, and rehabilitation”).
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induce a plea.”229 In addition, the guidelines established an internal review
procedure for plea bargains; they required that plea agreements be reviewed by
a supervising attorney and evaluated against office-level written guidance govern-
ing the standard elements of plea agreements.230
Federal immigration enforcement guidance provides another model. In a
series of memoranda, ICE authorities established departmental guidance about
what criteria should be used in immigration prosecutions, including a set of
prosecutorial priorities and guidelines for ICE agents to use in exercising
discretion.231 ICE also publishes data regarding its removals that allow the
public to assess how well it adheres to these stated priorities. ICE has long
exercised de facto discretion in choosing which noncitizen defendants to re-
move, but the memoranda standardize and make explicit the principles that
ought to guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Ethical rules that address collateral consequences could also guide the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutorial ethics as a whole does not contem-
plate prosecutorial power that arises as a result of the prosecutor’s control over
collateral consequences, as opposed to the criminal justice process itself.232
Thus, some prosecutors might regard a deviation from a standard plea to
accommodate a collateral penalty as favoritism, whereas others view mitigation
as necessary to avoid disproportionately burdening some defendants.233 Ethical
guidance could acknowledge that prosecutors have the functional ability to
enforce collateral consequences, and it could establish guidelines for when it is
or is not appropriate to do so. One dividing line could be based on what
considerations are appropriate to take into account. Arguably, the most problem-
atic instances of enforcement occur when prosecutors act pursuant to public
policy rationales as opposed to reasonable law-enforcement rationales, when
they seek collateral enforcement for retributive purposes, and when they lever-
age the threat of collateral consequences just to obtain a plea. Ethical guidance
could establish that these considerations should not be taken into account.
Lawmakers and courts have begun to recognize that, all too often, no actor
gives adequate consideration to the impact of collateral consequences during the
229. See id. at 2.
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reml-aliens.pdf [http://perma.cc/24L6-74RU].
232. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 3.8 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015).
233. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment: Immigration
Status and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417 (2011) (discussing how immigration status can
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criminal justice process. This has led to much-needed reforms designed to
promote awareness of collateral consequences. But, as courts and commentators
promote informed plea bargaining, it is important to recognize the range of
interests that prosecutors can bring to bear. Prosecutors can bring widely
divergent motivations, public policy preferences, and law-enforcement priorities
to the plea bargaining process. Prosecutors can mitigate disproportionate collat-
eral outcomes, seek to ensure that those outcomes will follow, or simply
strengthen their own bargaining position. As a result, the already-long arm of
prosecutorial discretion extends well beyond the criminal law and reaches a
range of important public policy decisions.
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